On Point: 9. Crimes

State v. David J. Gardner, 230 Wis. 2d 32, 601 N.W.2d 670 (Ct. App. 1999)
For Gardner: Steven P. Weiss, SPD, Madison Appellate

Holding: Gardner was convicted of burglary while armed, § 943.10(2), and argues that the crime requires a nexus of weapon to burglary. The argument fails, largely on authority of State v. Norris, 214 Wis. 2d 25, 571 N.W.2d 857 (Ct. App. 1997).

Gardner next challenges his conviction claiming that “due process of law and fundamental fairness demand” that there be some nexus between the commission of the underlying crime and the fact that the accused was carrying a weapon. 

State v. Louis Taylor, 226 Wis.2d 490, 595 N.W.2d 56 (Ct. App. 1999)
For Taylor: Donald T. Lang, SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue:  Whether a positive urine test, while the subject is under  is on bail with a no drug consumption bond condition, is sufficient to support a felony bail jumping conviction.

Holding:/Analysis:

“Where the State prosecutes an individual under Wis. Stat. § 946.49 for bail jumping,

State v. Suzette M. Ward, 228 Wis.2d 301, 596 N.W.2d 887 (Ct. App. 1999)
For Ward: Patricia L. Arreazola

Holding: The § 948.02(3) element, “person responsible for the welfare of a child,” was properly defined in jury instructions as “person employed or used by one legally responsible for the child’s welfare.” Payment, that is, isn’t required. Evidence of this element is therefore held sufficient, though the child care arrangement wasn’t fiscal.

State v. David J. Lenz, 230 Wis.2d 529, 602 N.W.2d 173 (Ct. App. 1999)
For Lenz: Steven D. Phillips, SPD, Madison Appellate.

Issue: Whether intercepts of tax refunds can be considered payments toward support obligations.

Holding: The nonsupport statute doesn’t require that payments be made “voluntarily,” and tax refund intercepts therefore count.

“The intercepts are payments from Lenz’s assets. Although he did not directly make them,

State v. Christopher M. Clutter, 230 Wis.2d 472, 602 N.W.2d 324 (Ct. App. 1999)
For Clutter: Martha K. Askins, SPD, Madison Appellate.

Issue: Whether the nonsupport defense of inability to pay is viable by showing “lack of financial resources alone.”

Holding: “(L)ack of financial resources alone is insufficient to demonstrate inability to pay.”

Inability to pay is a defense to nonsupport. Clutter, on postconviction motion,

State v. David J. Lenz, 230 Wis.2d 529, 602 N.W.2d 173 (Ct. App. 1999)
For Lenz: Steven D. Phillips, SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue: Whether a charge of § 948.22(2) nonsupport based on arrearages accrued more than six years prior to the charge is barred by the statute of limitations.

Holding: The crime of nonsupport is complete after each 120-day period of intentional failure to pay, including arrearages as well as current obligations,

State v. Ronald L. Monarch, 230 Wis.2d 542, 602 N.W.2d 179 (Ct. App. 1999)
For Monarch: Craig S. Lambert

Issue: Whether a charge of § 948.22(2) nonsupport based on arrearages accrued more than six years prior to the charge is barred by the statute of limitations

Holding:: The crime of nonsupport is complete after each 120-day period of intentional failure to pay, including arrearages as well as current obligations,

State v. Mark Inglin, 224 Wis.2d 764, 592 N.W.2d 666 (Ct. App. 1999)
For Inglin: Stephen M. Glynn & Robert R. Henak

Holding: Inglin argues denial of right to offer an affirmative defense to § 948.31(1)(b), namely that his actions were necessary to prevent mental harm to the child. Although his argument “present[s] an intriguing due process theory based on the interplay of § 948.04(2), Stats., and 948.31(4)(a), Stats.

State v. Mark Inglin, 224 Wis.2d 764, 592 N.W.2d 666 (Ct. App. 1999)
For Inglin: Stephen M. Glynn & Robert R. Henak

Holding: § 948.31(1)(b) penalizes several different actus reus alternatives, including taking a child away, or withholding a child more than 12 hours beyond court approval. Inglin had his ex-wife’s consent to take their child on a camping trip to Colorado. He deceived her, though, and fled with the child to Canada.

State v. Dawn C. Moline, 229 Wis. 2d 38, 598 N.W.2d 929 (Ct. App. 1999)
For Moline: Patrick M. Donnelly, SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue: Whether prior conviction for possessing drug paraphernalia, § 961.573, qualifies the offender as a repeat drug offender,  § 961.48(3).

Holding:

By this decision, we hold that a prior conviction for possessing drug paraphernalia pursuant to § 961.573, STATS., qualifies as a prior offense under the repeat drug offender statute,