On Point blog, page 85 of 87
§ 948.22(2), Nonsupport — “involuntary” payment via intercepts of tax refunds
State v. David J. Lenz, 230 Wis.2d 529, 602 N.W.2d 173 (Ct. App. 1999)
For Lenz: Steven D. Phillips, SPD, Madison Appellate.
Issue: Whether intercepts of tax refunds can be considered payments toward support obligations.
Holding: The nonsupport statute doesn’t require that payments be made “voluntarily,” and tax refund intercepts therefore count.
“The intercepts are payments from Lenz’s assets. Although he did not directly make them,
§ 948.22, Nonsupport — inability to pay
State v. Christopher M. Clutter, 230 Wis.2d 472, 602 N.W.2d 324 (Ct. App. 1999)
For Clutter: Martha K. Askins, SPD, Madison Appellate.
Issue: Whether the nonsupport defense of inability to pay is viable by showing “lack of financial resources alone.”
Holding: “(L)ack of financial resources alone is insufficient to demonstrate inability to pay.”
Inability to pay is a defense to nonsupport. Clutter, on postconviction motion,
§ 948.22(2), Nonsupport — statute of limitations, unit of prosecution
State v. David J. Lenz, 230 Wis.2d 529, 602 N.W.2d 173 (Ct. App. 1999)
For Lenz: Steven D. Phillips, SPD, Madison Appellate
Issue: Whether a charge of § 948.22(2) nonsupport based on arrearages accrued more than six years prior to the charge is barred by the statute of limitations.
Holding: The crime of nonsupport is complete after each 120-day period of intentional failure to pay, including arrearages as well as current obligations,
§ 948.22(2), Nonsupport –statute of limitations, unit of prosecution
State v. Ronald L. Monarch, 230 Wis.2d 542, 602 N.W.2d 179 (Ct. App. 1999)
For Monarch: Craig S. Lambert
Issue: Whether a charge of § 948.22(2) nonsupport based on arrearages accrued more than six years prior to the charge is barred by the statute of limitations
Holding:: The crime of nonsupport is complete after each 120-day period of intentional failure to pay, including arrearages as well as current obligations,
§ 948.31, Interference with Custody — Affirmative Defense
State v. Mark Inglin, 224 Wis.2d 764, 592 N.W.2d 666 (Ct. App. 1999)
For Inglin: Stephen M. Glynn & Robert R. Henak
Holding: Inglin argues denial of right to offer an affirmative defense to § 948.31(1)(b), namely that his actions were necessary to prevent mental harm to the child. Although his argument “present[s] an intriguing due process theory based on the interplay of § 948.04(2), Stats., and 948.31(4)(a), Stats.
§ 948.31, Interference with Custody — Sufficiency of evidence
State v. Mark Inglin, 224 Wis.2d 764, 592 N.W.2d 666 (Ct. App. 1999)
For Inglin: Stephen M. Glynn & Robert R. Henak
Holding: § 948.31(1)(b) penalizes several different actus reus alternatives, including taking a child away, or withholding a child more than 12 hours beyond court approval. Inglin had his ex-wife’s consent to take their child on a camping trip to Colorado. He deceived her, though, and fled with the child to Canada.
§ 961.48(3), Repeat Drug Offender – Prior Conviction for Drug Paraphernalia
State v. Dawn C. Moline, 229 Wis. 2d 38, 598 N.W.2d 929 (Ct. App. 1999)
For Moline: Patrick M. Donnelly, SPD, Madison Appellate
Issue: Whether prior conviction for possessing drug paraphernalia, § 961.573, qualifies the offender as a repeat drug offender, § 961.48(3).
Holding:
By this decision, we hold that a prior conviction for possessing drug paraphernalia pursuant to § 961.573, STATS., qualifies as a prior offense under the repeat drug offender statute,
Guilty Pleas – Factual Basis — Battery
State v. Charles Dante Higgs, 230 Wis.2d 1, 601 N.W.2d 653 (Ct. App. 1999)
For Higgs: Joseph E. Redding
Issue: Whether a sufficient factual basis was established on the element of bodily harm (where the defendant splashed the victim’s face with urine) to support a guilty plea to battery.
Holding: The mere fact that urine struck the victim’s face isn’t enough to establish bodily harm, but the victim’s preliminary hearing testimony that he felt stinging and burning satisfied the element.
Doubke Jeopardy – Multiplicity: Bail Jumping – Single Bond, Different Conditions
State v. Daniel Anderson, 219 Wis.2d 739, 580 N.W.2d 329 (1998), reversing State v. Anderson, 214 Wis. 2d 126, 570 N.W.2d 872 (Ct. App. 1997)
For Anderson: Jack E. Schairer, SPD, Madison Appellate
Issue: Whether violating different conditions of a single bond supports multiple bail jumping counts.
Holding: Anderson, released on an otherwise unrelated case, was ordered as a condition of bail not to drink or have contact with the victim.
First Amendment – Overbreadth – Flag Desecration
State v. Matthew C. Janssen, 219 Wis.2d 362, 580 N.W.2d 260 (1998), affirming 213 Wis. 2d 471, 570 N.W.2d 746 (Ct. App. 1997)
For Janssen: Eugene A. Bartman, Brian G. Figy, SPD, Appleton Trial
Issue: Whether the flag desecration statute is constitutional.
Holding: The flag desecration statute, sec. 946.05, violates first amendment overbreadth principles, and can’t be saved by severing the unconstitutional portions.