On Point: 11. Defense Wins

United States v. Dontray A. Smith, 7th Circuit Court of Appeals No. 14-2982, 7/20/15

Smith’s encounter with two officers on bicycles amounted to a seizure based on the totality of the circumstances surrounding the encounter, and because he was seized without reasonable suspicion, his Fourth Amendment rights were violated.

Village of Thiensville v. Conor B. Fisk, 2015AP576-FT, District 2, 8/26/15 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Sending the opposing party with a copy of a notice of appeal by email attachment satisfied § 800.14(1)‘s requirement that the appellant “giv[e] the municipal judge and other party written notice of appeal within 20 days of the judgment or decision.”

State v. Kim M. Lerdahl, 2014AP2119-CR, District 3, 8/4/15 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

In an interesting decision that sheds some light on how to apply the newly-adopted “reasonable mistake of law” doctrine to traffic stops, State v. Houghton, 2015 WI 79, ___ Wis. 2d ___, ___ N.W.2d ___,  the court of appeals holds that it a police officer’s mistaken belief that the truck she stopped was required to have a center high-mount stop (or brake) lamp (CHMSL) was not a reasonable mistake of law and, therefore, the stop was unlawful.

State v. Albert J. Chagnon, 2015 WI App 66; case activity (including briefs)

Under § 948.14, no registered sex offender may intentionally “capture a representation” of a minor without consent of the minor’s parent or guardian. The phrase “captures a representation” is defined in § 942.09(1)(a) to mean “takes a photograph, makes a motion picture, videotape, or other visual representation, or records or stores in any medium data that represents a visual image.” The court of appeals concludes the phrase “captures a representation” cannot reasonably be construed to apply to Chagnon’s act of cutting pictures of minors from magazines and newspapers, pasting them into a notebook, and adorning the pictures with graphic sexual comments.

State v. Kerby G. Denman, 2014AP2133, District 4, 7/9/15 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Denman is entitled to a hearing on his petition for discharge from his ch. 980 commitment because an expert changed her opinion about Denman’s risk to reoffend based on a new risk assessment scale that hadn’t been relied on by any of the experts at Denman’s previous discharge proceeding.

State v. Andrew Obriecht, 2015 WI 66, 7/7/15, reversing a published court of appeals decision; case activity (including briefs)

When sentence credit is granted after a convicted defendant’s parole is revoked, the additional credit must be applied to the parolee’s reincarceration time, and not—as the Department of Corrections and the court of appeals thought—to any period of parole remaining after the reincarceration time is served.

State v. Tommy Lee Branch, 2015 WI App 65; case activity (including briefs)

The circuit court had no authority to order cash seized from Branch on his arrest to be used to pay court obligations because there was no basis for concluding the money was not subject to return under § 968.20. As the court of appeals puts it, the cash Branch had at the time of his arrest was no different from any other personal property he had when arrested. “Had [Branch] been wearing a $200 Stetson hat, a $300 Gucci belt, or a pair of $500 Allen Edmonds shoes, the State would not be allowed to seize those items of personal property and sell them on eBay to pay Branch’s debts.” (¶10).

DeBartolo v. United States, 7th Circuit Court of Appeals No. 14-3579, 6/26/15

DeBartolo pleaded guilty to violating 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) by growing more than 100 marijuana plants, “[b]ut unbeknownst to DeBartolo, and also it seems to his lawyer, the prosecutors, and the judge, his conviction of the drug offense made him deportable (‘removable’ is the official term) and, were he ordered removed, would prevent him from applying for cancellation of removal.” (Slip op. at 3). Trial counsel was deficient for failing to advise DeBartolo of the deportation consequences, Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010), but—in light of the strength of the state’s case and the very favorable plea agreement DeBartolo received—has he shown prejudice? Yes, says a three-judge panel, in an opinion worth reviewing if you are litigating a similar issue.

Johnson v. United States, USSC No. 13-7120, 2015 WL 2473450 (June 26, 2015), reversing and remanding United States v. Johnson, 526 Fed. Appx. 708 (8th Cir. 2013) (per curiam) (unpublished) (8th Cir. 2013); Scotusblog page (including links to briefs and commentary)

A six-Justice majority of the Supreme Court holds that “the indeterminacy of the wide-ranging inquiry required by the residual clause [of the Armed Career Criminal Act] both denies fair notice to defendants and invites arbitrary enforcement by judges” because the case law has failed to establish a generally applicable test that prevents application of the clause from devolving into “guesswork and intuition.” (Slip op. at 5, 8). Therefore, using the residual clause to increase a defendant’s sentence denies the defendant due process of law.

Town of Bloomfield v. Petko Zvetkov Barashki, 2015AP226, District 2, 6/24/15 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

In a case the court of appeals aptly describes as “unusual,” the court exercises its discretionary power of reversal under § 752.35 to throw out Barashki’s OWI 1st conviction and refusal finding on the grounds that the evidence doesn’t show the officer had reasonable suspicion to stop Barashki.