On Point: 1. Consent

court of appeals decision; for Pickens: Eileen A. Hirsch, SPD, Madison Appellate

Reasonable Suspicion for Detention and “Collective Knowledge” Doctrine
Although, “under the collective knowledge doctrine, an investigating officer with knowledge of facts amounting to reasonable suspicion may direct a second officer without such knowledge to stop and detain a suspect,” the state must prove those underlying facts. “Proof is not supplied by the mere testimony of one officer that he relied on the unspecified knowledge of another officer,” ¶¶12-13.

State v. Jordan A. Denk, 2008 WI 130, on certification
For Denk: Lora B. Cerone, SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue/Holding: ¶20 n. 4:

… While Pickering could consent to a search of the vehicle, he could not consent to a search of his passenger. See State v. Matejka, 2001 WI 5, 241 Wis.  2d 52,

State v. Gary A. Johnson, 2007 WI 32, affirming 2006 WI App 15
For Johnson: Eileen A. Hirsch, SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue: Whether Johnson’s statement, “I don’t have a problem with that,” made in response to an officer’s assertion that they were “going to search the vehicle” was voluntary consent or mere acquiescence.

Holding:

¶19      As the record indicates,

State v. Roemie T. St. Germaine, 2007 WI App 214, PFR filed 9/27/07
For St. Germaine: Rex Anderegg

Issue: Whether the owner of the residence (Briseno) had apparent authority to consent to police search of renter St. Germaine’s room, at least where St. Germaine was present was consent was sought and never objected.

Holding:

¶17 St. Germaine argues that there was no reasonable basis for the officers to search his room because they knew it was rented and that Briseno could not consent.

State v. John J. Hartwig, 2007 WI App 160, PFR filed 5/22/07
For Hartwig: Wright C. Laufenberg

Issue/Holding: The trial court misread State v. Reginald Jones, 2005 WI App 26, to hold that consent to search is invalid whenever the person has been seized; rather, that case holds only that consent may be invalid when made following illegal seizure of the person.

State v. Philip R. Bons, 2007 WI App 124, PFR filed 4/24/07
For Bons: Vladimir M. Gorokhovsky

Issue/Holding:

¶18      The State has satisfied its burden to show the consent was voluntary. There is no suggestion of misrepresentation, deception, trickery or intimidation. The officers did not use weapons or force or otherwise take custody of Bons. Bons testified that Ramstack told him that he could be arrested,

State v. Gary A. Johnson, 2007 WI 32, affirming 2006 WI App 15
For Johnson: Eileen A. Hirsch, SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue/Holding:

¶16      When the purported legality of a warrantless search is based on the consent of the defendant, that consent must be freely and voluntarily given. State v. Phillips, 218 Wis. 2d 180, 197, 577 N.W.2d 794 (1998) (citations omitted).

State v. Jed A. Giebel, 2006 WI App 239
For Giebel: Robert E. Bellin, Jr.

Issue/Holding:

¶12   The test for voluntariness asks whether consent was given in the “absence of actual coercive, improper police practices designed to overcome the resistance of a defendant.” State v. Clappes, 136 Wis.  2d 222, 245, 401 N.W.2d 759 (1987). In making this determination, no single factor is dispositive. 

State v. Jed A. Giebel, 2006 WI App 239
For Giebel: Robert E. Bellin, Jr.

Issue: Whether Giebel’s “consent” to a search of his computer, in response to a police claim of a subpoena and accompanied by an expression that Giebel assumed he had no choice, was voluntary or mere acquiescence to asserted police authority.

Holding:

¶17   Three considerations weigh heavily in our decision.

State v. Shaun E. Kelley, 2005 WI App 199
For Kelley: Gregory Bates

Issue/Holding:

¶13      Kelley also argues that the search violated the scope of consent. He contends that an accelerant and phone handset could not have been found under his bed and therefore that place should not have been searched. We disagree. …

¶14      Here, the police were searching for a telephone handset and an accelerant.