On Point blog, page 9 of 12
Consent to Search
State v. Robert L. Stokes, 2009AP919-CR, District 1, 2/1/11
court of appeals decision (3-judge, not recommended for publication); for Stokes: John M. Bolger; case activity; Stokes BiC; State Resp.; Reply
Given trial court credibility findings, the resident’s consent to the police to enter and search was voluntary.
¶19 Finally, we are not convinced by Robert’s argument that the trial court erred in denying his suppression motion regardless of whether Deborah’s consent was valid because police had no lawful reason to be in the Stokes’ yard and on their porch.
State v. Chad W. Ebert, 2010AP1431-CR, District 2, 1/12/11
court of appeals decision (1-judge, not for publication); for Ebert: Chad A. Lanning; case activity; Ebert BiC; State Resp.; Reply
Consent-Based Entry
¶7 The Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement does not apply when police have consent to enter a dwelling. State v. Douglas, 123 Wis. 2d 13, 18, 365 N.W.2d 580 (1985). The issue in this appeal is whether Ebert’s uncle consented to the search of Ebert’s residence,
Confrontation – Generally – Forfeiture by Wrongdoing – Harmless Error; Other Acts Evidence: Pornography (& Intent to Kill); Consent to Search; Judicial Bias
State v. Mark D. Jensen, 2011 WI App 3; prior history: 2007 WI 26; for Jensen: Terry W. Rose, Christopher William Rose, Michael D. Cicchini; case activity; (Jensen BiC not posted); State Resp.; Jensen Reply
Confrontation – Generally
The Confrontation Clause regulates testimonial statements only, such that nontestimonial statements are excludable only under hearsay and other evidence-rule ¶¶22-26,
Search & Seizure: Consent to Enter – Expectation of Privacy (Overnight Guest) – Exigent Circumstances
State v. Miguel A. Ayala, 2011 WI App 6; for Ayala: Martin E. Kohler, Craig S. Powell; case activity; Ayala BiC; State Resp.; Reply
Search & Seizure – Consent to Enter
Based on trial court findings on disputed facts, the resident of an apartment gave the police consent to enter a bedroom and look for Ayala (as to whom,
Consensual Entry of Residence
State v. Mark A. Miller, 2010AP352-CR, District 4, 12/9/10
court of appeals decision (1-judge, not for publication); for Miller: Bill Ginsberg; Miller BiC; State Resp.
The court concludes that Miller voluntarily consented to police entreaties over an 11-minute period to enter his home so that they could perform field sobriety testing, notwithstanding his refusals during that time to allow entry:
¶7 The circuit court found that the officer spoke with Miller for approximately eleven minutes and,
USA v. Donald W. Simms, II, 7th Cir No. 10-1055, 11/23/10
Milwaukee’s ordinance-created “winter rules” with respect to snow removal effectively establish an “easement” such that police could enter a yard and rifle through a homeowner’s garbage cart. Although the cart is within what is normally considered “curtilage,” and thus protected by privacy concerns, the intrusion of the curtilage here is “lawful,” given this local law allowing garbage collectors to intrude on such areas.
But the fact that the defendant’s garbage carts were (we may assume) within the curtilage of his home does not conclude the constitutional analysis.
State v. Brian T. St. Martin, No. 2009AP1209-CR, review granted 10/27/10
decision below: certification; for St. Martin: Michael K. Gould, SPD, Milwaukee Appellate; court of appeals briefs: Resp.; Reply
Issue (from Table of Cases):
Whether the rule regarding consent to search a shared dwelling in Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103 (2006), which states that a warrantless search cannot be justified when a physically present resident expressly refuses consent,
State v. Brian T. St. Martin, No. 2009AP1209-CR, District II, 7/28/10, review granted 10/27/10
certification; for St. Martin: Michael K. Gould, SPD, Milwaukee Appellate; Resp.; Reply
Consent to Search – Georgia v. Randolph
The court of appeals certifies to the supreme court the following question:
Whether the rule regarding consent to search a shared dwelling in Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103 (2006), which states that a warrantless search cannot be justified when a physically present resident expressly refuses consent,
Warrantless Entry – Consent – Attenuation of Taint
State v. Robert L. Artic, Sr., 2010 WI 83, affirming 2009 WI App 12; for Artic: Keith A. Findley, James D. Cooley; BiC; Resp.; Reply
Notwithstanding an unlawful, forcible police entry into his residence, Artic voluntarily consented to the subsequent search of the house, which was also sufficiently attenuated from the illegal entry to purge the taint of the illegal entry.
Third-Party Consent: Seize and Search Computer
State v. David D. Ramage, 2010 WI App 77; for Ramage: Jevin J. Mulrooney; BiC; Resp.; Reply
Co-tenant’s permissive use of Ramage’s computers conferred on her authority to consent to warrantless police removal of computer and search of their contents. Contrary authority, People v. Blair, 748 N.E.2d 318 (Ill. App. Ct. 2001); State v. Lacey,