On Point blog, page 18 of 60
Court of appeals upholds “identification search” after arrest
State v. Janaya L. Moss, 2016AP1856-CR, 7/25/17 (1-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
Moss and another woman had a fight in a bar; responding police found Moss intoxicated to the point of incoherence. They arrested the other woman and frisked her, but could not find any identification (she would give only a first name). One officer noticed a wallet on a nearby table and asked the other woman if it was hers; she did not respond. The officer opened the wallet, revealing Moss’s ID but also cocaine and marijuana.
Sleeping while clutching taco = reasonable suspicion of OWI
State v. Tracy Dean Martin, 2017AP296, 7/25/17, District 1 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
An anonymous tipster told West Allis police that a man was asleep in a car parked across 4 spots at a Taco Bell. The lot was otherwise fairly empty. A check on the car’s registration revealed that its owner, Martin, had 3 prior OWIs and a .02 alcohol restriction. The officer approached the car, saw the headlights on, the keys in the ignition, and Martin asleep holding a taco in one of his hands.
SCOW upholds consent search after traffic stop; dissent criticizes “trajectory” of 4th Amendment decisions
Mike Tobin guest posts on State v. Lewis O. Floyd, Jr., 2017 WI 78, 7/7/17, affirming a published court of appeals opinion, 371 Wis. 2d 404; case activity (including briefs)
The majority opinion affirms the rulings of the lower courts that the defendant voluntarily consented to a frisk of his person following a traffic stop. The majority reached its decision without discussing the reasonableness of the officer’s suspicion of criminal activity-an issue emphasized in the dissenting opinion and previously analyzed by the court of appeals.
Officer’s driving didn’t create reasonable suspicion to stop driver
Marquette County v. Matthew J. Owens, 2016AP2176, District 4, 6/15/17 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
Owens argues that a police officer’s driving was so careless or unlawful that it required Owens to react in a way that created reasonable suspicion to stop him. Not so, says the court of appeals.
Totality of circumstances justified investigative detention
State v. Sara Ann Ponfil, 2016AP2059-CR, 5/31/17, District 3 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
A police officer discovered cocaine after he detained Ponfil, who, as the officer approached, got out of one of two vehicles parked next to each other outside a bar. The court of appeals concludes that, considered together, the bar’s status as a “high-crime area,” the behavior of the vehicles’ occupants, and the presence of a known gang member in the other vehicle provided reasonable suspicion to believe she was engaged in illegal conduct.
Warrant for arrest was reasonable suspicion to stop
City of Pewaukee v. John Jay Kennedy, 2016AP2383, 5/17/17, District II (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
An officer stopped Kennedy’s vehicle after running the plates and seeing that its registered owner, Kennedy, had a warrant out for his arrest. Kennedy was driving, and was eventually arrested for OWI.
Facts showed reasonable suspicion for extending traffic stop to conduct field sobriety tests
State v. Brian L. Zieglmeier, 2016AP1815-CR, 4/25/17, District 3 (1-judge opinion, ineligble for publication); case activity (including briefs)
What are the odds that a driver who had been drinking beer would get pulled over by an Officer Pilsner? That’s what happened to Zieglmeier, who had been going 42 in a 25 mph zone. While he didn’t seem disoriented when he spoke to Pilsner, he also didn’t pass the “smell test.”
Moving driver six miles to do FSTs was reasonable
County of Dodge v. Alexis N. Unser, 2016AP2172, 4/6/17, District 4 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
Unser wasn’t unlawfully moved outside the “vicinity” of the traffic stop when the officer transported her six miles to conduct field sobriety tests.
Inferences drawn from squad car video support reasonable suspicion of traffic violation
State v. Terrence L. Perkins, 2016AP1427-CR,4/4/17, District 3, (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
At Perkins’ suppression hearing, Officer Stetzer testified that he saw Perkins drive through a stop sign and part way through a cross walk into the middle of an intersection where he then backed up to allow a car to pass before proceeding. The squad car video did not capture Perkins’ stop sign violation; it only recorded him backing up. Perkins argued that the position of the squad car would have prevented the officer from seeing whether he complied with the stop sign before proceeding into the intersection. He thus argued that Stetzer lacked reasonable suspicion to stop him.
Crossing fog line and pulling into closed business at 1:30 a.m. is reasonable suspicion of OWI
County of Marathon v. Armin James Balzar, 2016AP1471, 3/14/17, District 3 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
Balzar argues on appeal that the stop of his vehicle was not supported by reasonable suspicion because it was based on the “act of simply turning into a closed business parking lot, without more.” (¶8). The court disagrees.