On Point: D. Type of punishment

State v. Chad W. Ziegler, 2006 WI App 49, PFR filed 3/13/06
For Ziegler: Kenneth P. Casey, UW Law School

Issue/Holding:

¶32      We conclude that the trial court’s sentencing remarks satisfy Hall as to the reasons for the consecutive sentences and Gallion as to the reasons for the length of the sentence. As noted, the trial court engaged in a thorough and exhaustive examination of the relevant sentencing objectives and factors.

State v. Kevin J. Helsper, 2006 WI App 243
For Helsper: Glenn L. Cushing, SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue/Holding:

¶20      Fines and attorney fee obligations involve different State purposes, and therefore a different constitutional analysis. When analyzing the constitutionality of a fee recoupment statute, the court is to consider, among other things, the rationality of the connection between legislative means and purpose and the existence of alternative means for effectuating the purpose. 

State v. Kevin J. Helsper, 2006 WI App 243
For Helsper: Glenn L. Cushing, SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue/Holding:

¶7        Constitutional limits on a state’s recoupment of attorney fees are grounded in both due process and equal protection principles. Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 665 (1983). Recoupment statutes must be tailored to “impose an obligation only upon those with a foreseeable ability to meet it,

State v. Jonathan Owens, 2006 WI App 75, PFR filed 4/4/06
For Owens: Dianne M. Erickson

Issue: Whether the sentencing court’s initial denial of ERP eligibility, seemingly on the improper basis of the defendant’s age, was a proper exercise of discretion where on motion for reconsideration the court “stated that it had intended to refer to Owens’s age regarding his eligibility for the Challenge Incarceration Program only [and] then explained why it had denied Owens’s participation in the ERP and denied the motion for reconsideration.”

Holding:

¶9        Owens complains that even though the trial court set forth an explanation for its sentence,

State v. Gerald L. Lynch, Jr., 2006 WI App 231, PFR filed 11/6/06
For Lynch: David R. Karpe

Issue: Whether statutory ineligibility for Earned Release, § 973.01(3g), for homicide by intoxicated use violates equal protection given eligibility for driving while intoxicated but not causing death or great bodily harm.

Holding:

¶18      Applying this standard, we conclude there is a rational basis for not allowing persons convicted of crimes under Wis.

State v. Ryan E. Baker, 2005 WI App 45, PFR filed 3/17/05
For Baker: William E. Schmaal, SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue/Holding: Sentence credit may not be used to satisfy court costs, where costs were imposed under provisions which do not grant authority to waive or otherwise avoid their imposition:

¶11                        We turn now to whether credit for pre-sentence incarceration time may be applied to satisfy court costs.  

State v. Mark R. Johnson, 2005 WI App 201
For Johnson: Jefren Olsen , SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue/Holding:

¶13      Second, before a trial court may order restitution “there must be a showing that the defendant’s criminal activity was a substantial factor in causing” pecuniary injury to the victim in a “but for” sense. Longmire, 272 Wis. 2d 759, ¶13; State v.

State v. Mark R. Johnson, 2005 WI App 201
For Johnson: Jefren Olsen, SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue/Holding:

¶12      First, restitution is limited to “special damages … which could be recovered in a civil action against the defendant for his or her conduct in the commission of a crime considered at sentencing.” Wis. Stat. § 973.20(5)(a). The term “special damages” as used in the criminal restitution context means any readily ascertainable pecuniary expenditure paid out because of the crime. 

State v. Mark R. Johnson, 2005 WI App 201
For Johnson: Jefren Olsen , SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue/Holding1: Lost profits are “special damages,” and therefore subject to a restitution order, because the underlying causal criminal conduct could give rise to a civil action based on the torts of conversion and interference with prospective contractual relationships, ¶¶16-17.

Issue/Holding2: Because at least a minimal amount of speculation inheres to such a claim,

State v. Lonnie C. Davis, 2005 WI App 98
For Davis: Pamela Moorshead

Issue/Holding:

¶24 Davis next contends that the trial court erroneously exercised its discretion when it imposed consecutive sentences without an adequate explanation of why that was the minimum amount of time necessary.  We reject this claim.¶25      The trial court explained why the maximum term was required in this case.

…

¶26      … The court must provide an explanation for the general range of the sentence imposed,