On Point: 36. Sentencing

State v. Michael A. Rakel, 2017AP2519, 2/17/21, District 1 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Michael Rakel was convicted of the 1st degree reckless homicide of Andre Taylor, who had a teenage daughter. Taylor was under a court order to pay child support to her. The court of appeals held that Rakel must now pay restitution in an amount equal to Taylor’s child support obligation.  However, the record was unclear about whether the mother of Taylor’s daughter was eligible to receive the restitution payment for the daughter. The court of appeals remanded the case for further proceedings on that issue.

State v. James A. Jones, 2021 WI App 15; case activity (including briefs)

Sometimes friends or relatives post bail so that a loved one charged with a crime can be released. This published decision holds that when charges are dismissed and read in at sentencing, and the court doesn’t order restitution on those charges, the bond money must be returned to the payors. This rule applies even to global plea deals where the defendant pleads “no contest” to and is ordered to pay restitution on some charges, but other charges are dismissed and read in without a restitution order.

State v. Alfonso C. Loayza, 2021 WI 11, 2/11/21, reversing a per curiam decision of the court of appeals; case activity (including briefs)

The supreme court unanimously holds that the state proved by a preponderance of the evidence that Loayza was convicted of OWI in California in 1990, making his current Wisconsin offense a eighth offense.

State v. Westley D. Whitaker, 2021 WI App 17, petition to review granted, 6/16/21, affirmed, 2022 WI 54; case activity (including briefs)

This appeal raises a hot-button issue likely to interest SCOW. Just last year an investigative journalist reported that Amish communities do not report sexual assaults of children to social workers or police. Parents and church elders strive to address the problem themselves. (NPR story). That’s what happened in Whitaker’s case. He repeatedly sexually assaulted his younger sisters then stopped when he was 14. His crimes went unreported until he was 25, well after he had left the Amish community. He pled to one count of 1st-degree child sexul assault and requested a “fines only” sentence. The circuit court found no risk that he would re-offend and no need for rehabilitation. Yet it imposed a prison sentence in order to “send a message” to the Amish community that this behavior is unacceptable and members need to report it.

State v. C.G., 2021 WI App 11; petition for review granted 4/27; case activity

Ella–a pseudonym–was adjudicated delinquent for a sexual assault committed when she was 15. Ella’s legal name is masculine in association; during her juvenile disposition she was transitioning to a female identity. In this appeal she challenges the circuit court’s refusal to stay sex offender registration under Cesar G., and also submits that the registry’s prohibition on changing her legal name violates her First Amendment right to express her identity. The court of appeals upholds the circuit court’s discretionary decision on the former claim; on the latter it offers three blithe paragraphs of discussion before casually announcing–in a decision that is set to be published, and thus binding–that requiring a transgender woman to use a man’s name implicates no First Amendment concerns whatsoever.

State v. Cesar Antonio Lira, 2019AO691-CR, petition for review granted 1/20/21; case activity

Issues presented (from the State’s PFR):

1. Under §973.155, a convicted offender is entitled to sentence credit for “all days spent in custody in connection with the course of conduct for which sentence was imposed.” And §973.15(5) provides that an offender lawfully made available to another jurisdiction is entitled to credit for custody time in that jurisdiction “under the terms of s. 973.155.”

The court of appeals awarded Lira over 11 years of credit for custody in Oklahoma under §973.15(5), despite the fact that the Oklahoma sentence was not “in connection with” the Wisconsin offenses for which he was sentenced. It relied on State v. Brown, 2006 WI App 41, 289 Wis. 2d 823, 711 N.W.2d 708, which holds that courts determining credit under section 973.15(5) may not consider “the terms of s. 973.155,” including whether the custody in the other jurisdiction is “in connection with” the Wisconsin offense.

State v. Octavia W. Dodson, 2018AP1476-CR, petition for review granted 1/20/21; case activity (including briefs)

Issue presented:

Did the sentencing court violate Dodson’s Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms by considering his status as a lawful gun owner an aggravating factor at sentencing?

State v. Todd N. Triebold, 2021 WI App 13; case activity (including briefs)

Triebold was convicted of child sexual assault in Wisconsin and subject to lifetime sex offender registration. He moved to Minnesota and notified the Wisconsin DOC of his address. But he moved again and failed to notify either Wisconsin or Minnesota of his change in address. He was separately convicted of violating the sex offender registration laws of Minnesota and Wisconsin. This appeal concerns his challenges to his Wisconsin conviction. The court’s decision is recommended for publication.

State v. Anthony M. Schmidt, 2020AP616-CR, petition for bypass granted 12/28/20; case activity

1. Does Wis. Stat. §973.042 (the child pornography surcharge statute) permit the circuit court to impose a child pornography surcharge for an offense that is “read in” for sentencing purposes?
2. Is the child pornography surcharge a punishment that must be explained during a plea colloquy? If so, was Schmidt entitled to a hearing on his claim that the plea colloquy was deficient in this case?

State v. Jeffrey R. Lindahl, 2019AP997-CR, District 3, 12/15/20 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

In State v. Hahn, 2000 WI 118, 238 Wis. 2d 889, 618 N.W.2d 528, the supreme court held that a collateral attack against a prior conviction used to enhance a penalty must be based on the denial of the right to counsel in the prior case. The court of appeals holds that “denial of the right to counsel” doesn’t include denial of the right to the effective assistance of counsel.