On Point blog, page 73 of 81
Habeas relief granted because penalty enhancement statute is unconstitutionally vague
Walker Whatley v. Dushan Zatecky, 7th Circuit Court of Appeals No. 14-2534, 2016 WL 4269805, 8/15/16
The maximum penalty for Whatley’s drug possession conviction was dramatically increased—from 2-to-8 years to 20-to-50 years—under a now-repealed Indiana penalty enhancer for drug offenses committed within 1,000 feet of a “youth program center,” defined as a “building or structure that on a regular basis provides recreational, vocational, academic, social, or other programs” for youth. (Sound familiar? Sure it does: see §§ 961.01(22) and 961.49(1m)(b)5.) On habeas review, the Seventh Circuit holds that the statute’s failure to provide an objective standard for determining what “regular” means makes the statute unconstitutionally vague, so Whatley is entitled to resentencing under the non-enhanced penalty scheme.
Brendan Dassey conviction overturned
Brendan Dassey v. Michael A. Dittmann, U.S. District Court (E.D. Wis.) No. 14-CV-1310, 2016 WL 4257386, 8/12/16
Brendan Dassey was charged with homicide and sexual assault after confessing to being involved in the murder of Teresa Halbach along with his uncle, Steven Avery. He challenged his confession, arguing it was involuntary, but the trial court and court of appeals disagreed. In a lengthy, fact-intensive decision, a federal magistrate holds that the state courts’ conclusions involve both an unreasonable determination of the facts and an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law.
Parking while black
In May, On Point reported on U.S. v. Randy Johnson, a split decision by the 7th Circuit in which the dissent accused the majority of authorizing Milwaukee police to seize someone for “parking while black.” See our post here. Guess what? The 7th Circuit just granted rehearing en banc, so stay tuned for further developments this case.
Habeas petitioner entitled to hearing on “textbook” improper vouching claim
Joseph J. Jordan v. Randall R. Hepp, 7th Circuit Court of Appeals No. 14-3613, 2016 WL 4119862, 8/3/16
Jordan claims the Wisconsin courts unreasonably applied clearly established federal law when they held that he was not denied the right to represent himself and that his trial lawyer was not ineffective for failing to object to the prosecutor’s improper vouching for a police witness’s credibility. The Seventh Circuit okays the state courts’ decision on self-representation but orders a hearing on Jordan’s ineffective assistance claim.
Court of appeals instructs defense on grammar and punctuation, proper interpretation of 939.617 depends on it
State v. Markus S. Holcomb, 2016 WI App 70; case activity (including briefs)
“While sentence diagramming may be the bane of fifth graders everywhere, it is the trick of the trade in statutory construction.” Slip op. ¶9. “Punctuation too is important. . . . It can be the difference between ‘Let’s eat, Grandma!’ and ‘Let’s eat Grandma!'” ¶12. So begins today’s lesson on the proper way to read §939.617, which provides minimum sentences for certain child sex offenses.
It’s not coercive to force driver to choose between a blood draw or license revocation that is legally unsustainable
State v. Adam M. Blackman, 2016 WI App 69; petition for review granted 6/15/16, reversed, 2017 WI 77; case activity (including briefs)
A recent amendment to Wisconsin’s implied consent law authorizes law enforcement to request a blood, breath, or urine sample from a driver involved in an accident that causes death or great bodily harm even if there is no evidence that the driver was impaired by alcohol or a controlled substance. §343.305(3)(ar)2. If the driver refuses, his license is revoked, but he may request a refusal hearing within 10 days. §343.305(9)(a). But as §343.305(9)(a)5, the refusal hearing statute, is currently written the State could not prevail.
Defense win! Warrant can’t be based on anonymous tip lacking detail; exclusionary rule applies
State v. Paul L. Linde, 2014AP2445-CR, 8/2/16, District 3 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)
A court commissioner issued a warrant to search Linde’s cabin for evidence of drug manufacturing and for drug paraphernalia. It was based in part on a tip by an anonymous informant, a fact that proved decisive in the court of appeals decision to reverse the circuit court’s denial of Linde’s suppression motion.
How “search for the truth” jury instructions impact verdicts
Attorney Michael Cicchini and Professor Lawrence White previously documented here that jurors who were told to “search for the truth” were much more likely to convict a defendant even if they had reasonable doubt about his guilt than those who were properly instructed on reasonable doubt. In other words, truth-related language lowers the State’s burden of proof. Their new study confirms their earlier findings, discusses the cognitive link between jury instructions and conviction rates,
Court of appeals ignores “Perry Mason” moment; finds defense discovery violation, but no ineffective assistance of counsel
State v. William J. Thurber, 2015AP161-CR, 7/27/16, District 2 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)
“Was Thurber’s trial a game being played or was it a trial designed to search for the truth? Thurber is certainly no angel as evidenced by his current long-term incarceration for crimes apart from this case. I believe the justice system best defines itself by scrupulously adhering to high standards when the worst of the worst comes before it. We travel a slippery slope when we excuse mistakes by the judiciary, the State, and defense counsel because we ‘know’ the defendant is a criminal.” Slip op. ¶91. (Reilly, J. dissenting).
Time spent confined for traffic offense sentence is excluded from 5-year repeater period
State v. Jason R. Cooper, 2016 WI App 63; case activity (including briefs)
While a conviction for a motor vehicle offense can’t be used to establish a defendant’s repeater status under § 939.62, time a defendant spent in custody serving a sentence for a motor vehicle is still excluded when computing whether any prior convictions for non-motor vehicle offenses occurred within five years of the crime for which the defendant is being sentenced.