On Point blog, page 4 of 25
SCOTUS addresses plain error challenges to federal felon-in-possession cases after Rehaif
Greer v. United States, USSC No. 19-8709, together with United States v. Gary, USSC No. 20-444, June 14. 2021; Scotusblog pages for Greer and Gary (including links to briefs and commentary)
These two federal felon-in-possession defendants were convicted before Rehaif v. United States, 588 U.S. ___ (2019), which held that, under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g), the government must prove that the defendant knew he was a felon at the time he possessed a firearm. Thus, they seek relief from their convictions under the onerous plain-error standard. The Court holds they have met their burden.
SCOTUS: Indian tribes retain power to detain and search non-Indians on Indian land
United States v. Cooley, USSC No. 19-1414, 141 S.Ct. 1638 (June 1, 2021), vacating and remanding 919 F.3d 1135 (9th Cir. 2019); Scotusblog page (including links to briefs and commentary)
A unanimous Court holds that tribal police officers have the power to search and temporarily detain non-Indians suspected of breaking federal or state laws within reservations.
SCOTUS holds tribal officer may detain non-Indian on reservation roadway for violations of state or federal law
United States v. Cooley, USSC No. 19-1414, 2021 WL 2194835, 6/1/21, vacating 919 F.3d 1135 (9th Cir. 2019)
Cooley’s truck, parked on the side of a US highway running through the Crow Reservation in Montana, attracted the attention of a Crow Police Department officer. The officer said that when he approached the truck, he found Cooley “appeared to be non-native” and showed signs of intoxication; he also had two semiautomatic rifles on his front seat. The officer eventually ordered Cooley out of the truck and patted him down; eventually he would discover methamphetamine and paraphernalia in the vehicle.
SCOTUS interprets federal statute governing collateral attack on removal orders
United States v. Palomar-Santiago, USSC No. 20-437, May 24, 2021, reversing and remanding 813 Fed. Appx. 282 (9th Cir. 2020); Scotusblog page (including links to briefs and commentary)
Under 8 U.S.C. §1326(d), a person removed from the U.S. for a criminal conviction and then charged with illegally reentering the country may collaterally attack the removal order if he or she meets three criteria: (1) the person any exhausted administrative remedies available to challenged the order;
SCOTUS eliminates “watershed rule” exception to retroactivity doctrine
Edwards v. Vannoy, USSC No. 19-5807, 141 S.Ct. 1547 (May 17, 2021), affirming 2019 WL 8643258 (5th Cir. May 20, 2019) (denying certificate of appealability); Scotusblog page (including links to briefs and commentary)
This decision alters the long-standing doctrine for deciding whether new rules of criminal procedure established by a decision of the Supreme Court apply retroactively to cases that are final and, therefore, require the defendant to seek collateral review of his or her conviction. The result is that new rules of criminal procedure will no more forever apply retroactively to cases on collateral review.
SCOTUS disclaims “community caretaking” as a “standalone doctrine”; at least as to the home
Caniglia v. Strom, USSC No. 20-157, 2021 WL 1951784 , May 17, 2021; Scotusblog page (including links to briefs and commentary)
In four quick pages, a unanimous Supreme Court rejects the notion that the police have a “caretaking” duty that “creates a standalone doctrine that justifies warrantless searches and seizures in the home.” This undoes a lot of law, in Wisconsin and elsewhere; at a minimum we can say that State v. Pinkard, 2010 WI 81, 327 Wis. 2d 346, 785 N.W.2d 592 and State v. Matalonis, 2016 WI 7, 366 Wis. 2d 443, 875 N.W.2d 567, both of which permitted entries to residences on “community caretaker” grounds, are no longer valid. But the brevity of the decision leaves a lot of questions unanswered; and its unanimity (as the concurrences show) obscures real disagreement about just what the Court has decided.
SCOTUS: That stuff we said about not usually sentencing juveniles to life without parole? Nevermind.
Jones v. Mississippi, USSC No. 18-1259, 2021 WL 1566605, April 22, 2021; Scotusblog page (including links to briefs and commentary)
“In a case involving [sentencing] an individual who was under 18 when he or she committed a homicide [to life without parole], a State’s discretionary sentencing system is both constitutionally necessary and constitutionally sufficient.” (Slip op. at 5) (emphasis added).
SCOTUS may clarify standard for AEDPA habeas review of state-court harmlessness determination
Brown v. Davenport, No. 20-826, cert. granted 4/5/21; Scotusblog page
Question presented: May a federal habeas court grant relief based solely on its conclusion that the Brecht test is satisfied, as the Sixth Circuit held, or must the court also find that the state court’s Chapman application was unreasonable under § 2254(d)(1), as the Second, Third, Seventh, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits have held?
SCOTUS says shooting can be Fourth Amendment seizure
Torres v. Madrid, USSC No. 19-292, 2021 WL 1132514, 3/25/21, reversing 769 Fed. Appx. 654 (10th Cir. 2019); Scotusblog page (including links to briefs and commentary)
Fans of dueling citations to ancient cases will want to savor the entirety of the majority and the somewhat heated dissent in this case; the serjeants-at-mace shew their mace at one point. Everybody else just needs to know this: a police officer who applies physical force to the body of a person seizes that person if the objective circumstances show an intent to restrain. This seizure occurs during the application of that force even if the intended restraint doesn’t succeed; that is, if the person gets away. And that force can be communicated by means of a projectile, like a bullet.
SCOTUS addresses federal PLRA “three strikes” rule
Lomax v. Ortiz-Marquez, USSC No. 18-8369, 2020 WL 3038282, 6/8/20, affirming 754 Fed. Appx. 756 (10th Cir. 2018); Scotusblog page (including links to briefs and commentary)
The federal Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) bars a prisoner from being able to file a lawsuit without first paying filing fees if the prisoner has “three strikes”—that is, has had three or more prior suits dismissed because they were frivolous, malicious, or failed to state a claim. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). The issue here is whether the dismissal had to be with prejudice, or whether a dismissal without prejudice counts, too. It does, says a unanimous Court.