On Point: B. Opinions

Mitchell v. Wisconsin, No. 18-6210, 6/29/19, vacating and remanding State v. Mitchell, 2018 WI 84, Scotusblog page (including links to briefs and commentary)

This is the decision we’ve all been waiting for on whether a blood draw from an unconscious OWI suspect requires a warrant. Wouldn’t you know–the opinion is splintered. Alito, writing for 4 justices (a plurality, not a majority), concludes that when a driver is unconscious and cannot be given a breath test, the exigent-circumstances doctrine generally permits a blood draw with out a warrant. The plurality vacates the judgment and remands the case for a hearing so that Mitchell has a chance to show that there were no exigent circumstances in his case. Way to go, Andy Hinkel, for fending off the State’s contention that implied consent is actual consent.

Terance Martez Gamble v. United States, USSC No. 17-646, 2019 WL 2493923, June 17, 2019, affirming United States v. Gamble, 694 Fed. Appx. 750 (11th Cir. 2017); Scotusblog page (includes links to briefs and commentary)

Gamble challenged the validity of the “dual-sovereignty” doctrine, which holds that it doesn’t violate the Fifth Amendment’s Double Jeopardy Clause to convict a person in both state and federal court for the same crime. By a 7-2 vote, the Court rejects his challenge.

Quarles v. United States, No. 17-778, 6/10/19, affirming United States v. Quarles, 850 F.3d 836 (6th Cir. 2017); Scotusblog page (including links to briefs and commentary)

Quarles was convicted of home invasion in Michigan. When he was later charged with being a felon in possession of a firearm, that ealier conviction became one of the prior offenses that dramatically increased his sentence under the Armed Career Criminal Act. The question here is whether, under SCOTUS’s “categorical approach,” the Michigan home invasion statute qualifies as a generic burglary.

Mont v. United States, USSC No. 17-8995, June 3, 2019, affirming United States v. Mont, 723 Fed. Appx. 325 (6th Cir. 2018); Scotusblog page (includes links to briefs and commentary)

Under 18 U.S.C. § 3624(e), the period of supervised release imposed as part of a federal sentence is “tolled” during “any period the person is imprisoned in connection with a conviction for a crime….” In a decision of interest to federal practitioners, the Supreme Court holds that the period the person is imprisoned includes pretrial custody in a case that is later credited toward the sentence imposed for a new conviction.

Timbs v. Indiana, USSC No. 17-1091, February 20, 2019, reversing State v. Timbs, 84 N.E.3d 1179 (Ind. 2017); Scotusblog page (including links to briefs and commentary)

“The question presented: Is the Eighth Amendment’s Excessive Fines Clause an ‘incorporated’ protection applicable to the States under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause?” The answer: Yes.

Garza v. Idaho, USSC No. 17-1026, reversing Garza v. State, 405 P.3d 576 (Idaho 2017);  Scotusblog page (includes links to briefs and commentary)

This case involved two plea agreements that included clauses stating that Garza waived his right to appeal. After sentencing, Garza told his lawyer that he wanted to appeal, but his lawyer refused due to the plea agreement. Garza filed claim for ineffective assistance of counsel. Siding with Garza, SCOTUS held that counsel performed deficiently and that “prejudiced is presumed” because the failure to file a notice of appeal deprived Garza of an appeal altogether. Opinion at 1. 

Fortunately, Wisconsin does not have the death penalty. However, On Point readers might find this SCOTUS decision Madison v. Alabama, interesting. The government cannot execute a prisoner who is insane or is so mentally ill that he can’t understand the State’s rationale for executing him. Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986) and Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930 (2007).

Carpenter v. United States, USSC No. 16-402, 2018 WL 3073916, reversing United States v. Carpenter, 819 F.3d 880 (6th Cir. 2016); Scotusblog page (includes links to briefs and commentary)

This one is a big deal. It’s impossible to say just where the law will go from here, but it’s clear there will be a lot of cases citing this one in the coming years, both because cell-site location is already a widely-used law enforcement tool, and because the majority opinion has a lot to say about what Fourth Amendment “privacy” might mean now that we all share, often unwittingly, so much information about ourselves with the entities that enable our digital lives.

Currier v. Virginia, USSC No. 16-1348, 2018 WL 3073763, June 22, 2018, affirming State v. Currier, 779 S.E.2d 834 (Va. App. 2015), reasoning adopted by 798 S.E.2d 164 (Va. 2016); Scotusblog page (includes links to briefs and commentary)

A defendant who agrees to have overlapping charges considered in two separate trials cannot invoke the doctrine of issue preclusion adopted in Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436 (1970), and argue that an acquittal in the first trial bars a second trial on the remaining charges.

Rosales-Mireles v. United States, USSC No. 16-9493, 2018 WL 3013806, 6/18/18, reversing United States v. Rosales-Mireles, 850 F.3d 246 (5th Cir. 2017); SCOTUSblog page (includes links to briefs and commentary)

As we noted in our prior post, this case is primarily of interest to federal practitioners, dealing as it does with the federal sentencing guidelines and the doctrine of plain error, which is little-used in Wisconsin’s courts. Nevertheless, the seven-justice majority has some ringing language exhorting courts, in the interest of their own legitimacy, to cop to their own errors when those errors lead to unwarranted consequences for criminal defendants.