On Point: B. Opinions

Rodney Class v. United States, USSC No. 16-424, 2018 WL 987347 (February 21, 2018), reversing United States v. Class, (unreported) (D.C. Cir. 2016); Scotusblog page (inlcuding links to briefs and commentary)

“The question [in this case] is whether a guilty plea by itself bars a federal criminal defendant from challenging the constitutionality of the statute of conviction on direct appeal. We hold that it does not. Class did not relinquish his right to appeal the District Court’s constitutional determinations simply by pleading guilty.” (Slip op. at 3).

District of Columbia v. Wesby, USSC No. 15-1485, 2017 WL 491521 (January 22, 2018), reversing Wesby v. District of Columbia, 765 F.3d 13 (D.C. Cir. 2014); Scotusblog page (including links to briefs and commentary)

The probable-cause determination in this case is quite fact-specific, and the qualified immunity issue is of little interest to criminal practitioners. Perhaps more interesting is Justice Ginsburg’s concurrence, which signals she is open to reconsidering whether the existence of probable cause necessarily validates an arrest.

Erick Daniel Davila v. Lorie Davis, USSC No. 16-6219, 2017 WL 2722418 (June 26, 2017), affirming Davila v. Davis, No. 15-70013 (5th Cir., May 31, 2016) (unpublished); Scotusblog page (including links to briefs and commentary)

In a 5-to-4 decision, the Supreme Court holds that ineffective assistance of counsel in state postconviction proceedings does not provide cause to excuse, in a subsequent federal habeas proceeding, a procedurally defaulted claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel.

Divna Maslenjak v. United States, USSC No. 16-309, 2017 WL 2674154 (June 22, 2017), reversing U.S. v. Maslenjak, 821 F.3d 675 (6th Cir. 2016); Scotusblog page (including links to briefs and commentary)

This case will be of interest to federal practitioners only. The Sixth Circuit had taken a position in conflict with the Seventh, United States v. Latchin, 554 F.3d 709,

Jae Lee v. United States, USSC No. 16-327, 2017 WL 2694701 (June 23, 2017), reversing Lee v. United States, 825 F.3d 311 (6th Cir. 2016); Scotusblog page (including links to briefs and commentary)

Lee’s lawyer told him he would not be deported if he pleaded guilty to a drug charge. His lawyer was wrong, so he performed deficiently under Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010). But can Lee establish his lawyer’s indisputably wrong advice prejudiced him, i.e., that he would have gone to trial had he known he would be deported even though he had no real prospect of acquittal? Yes, says a majority of the Supreme Court, rejecting the approach urged by the Government and adopted by some federal circuits.

Weaver v. Massachusetts, USSC No. 16-240, 2017 WL 2674153 (June 22, 2017); affirming Commonwealth v. Weaver, 54 N.E.3d 495 (Mass. 2016); Scotusblog page (including links to briefs and commentary)

Members of the public–specifically, Kentel Weaver’s family–were excluded from the overcrowded courtroom during jury selection for his trial. Violations of the Sixth Amendment right to public trial have been called structural errors not susceptible to harmless error analysis. But Weaver’s lawyer didn’t object, so this is an ineffective assistance claim, which of course requires him to show prejudice. But how do you show that you were prejudiced by a structural error–after all, the term refers to an error whose “effect … cannot be ascertained”? United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 149 n.4 (2006).

Packingham v. North Carolina, USSC No. 15-1194, 2017 WL 2621313 (June 19, 2017); reversing State v. Packingham, 777 S.E.2d 738 (N.C. 2015); Scotusblog page (including links to briefs and commentary)

Lester Packingham was convicted for having sex with a 13 year old when he was 21, and was thus required to register as a sex offender for 30 years or more. Eight years later, having completed his sentence, Packingham posted on Facebook to celebrate the dismissal of a traffic ticket. He was charged with, and eventually pled to, a felony under a North Carolina law that prohibits those on the registry from accessing “a commercial social networking Web site” if they know the site allows children to sign up.

Charles Turner, et al., v. United States, USSC Nos. 15-1503 & 15-1504, 2017 WL 2674152 (June 22, 2017), affirming Turner v. U.S., 116 A.3d 894 (D.C. App. 2015); Scotusblog page (including links to briefs and commentary)

In granting cert in this case the Court told the parties to brief one issue: Whether the convictions of the petitioners must be set aside under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). We thought the case might be the occasion for the Court to say something important about Brady, but that didn’t happen. The Court simply says the issue before it “is legally simple but factually complex” (slip op. at 11), applies the Brady standard without alteration or elaboration, and concludes the convictions stand.

McWilliams v. Dunn, USSC No. 16-5295, 2017 WL 2621324 (June 19, 2017), reversing McWilliams v. Dunn, 634 Fed.Appx. 698 (11th Cir. 2015); Scotusblog page (including links to briefs and commentary)

A win for defendants in capital cases. Ake v. Oklahoma “clearly established” that when an indigent defendant demonstrates that his sanity at the time of the offense is to be a significant fact at trial, the State must provide him with access to a competent psychiatrist who will conduct an appropriate (1) examination and assist in (2) evaluation, (3) preparation, and (4) presentation of the defense. Ake did not specifically require the appointment of a defense team expert (as opposed to a neutral expert). It left that issue open, and with this decision SCOTUS leaves the issue open. It does hold, however, that simplest way for a state to satisfy Ake is to prove the defense with its own psychiatric expert.

Charlotte Jenkins v. Percy Hutton, USSC No. 16-1116, 2017 WL 2621321 (June 19, 2017) (per curiam), reversing Hutton v. Mitchell, 839 F.3d 486 (2016)( 6th Cir. 2016); Scotusblog page (including links to briefs and commentary)

Hutton filed a federal habeas petition challenging his death sentence on the grounds that the jury at the penalty phase of his trial hadn’t been sufficiently instructed to consider only the aggravating factors that had been proven during the guilt phase. But he didn’t object to the instructions at trial and didn’t raise instructional error on direct appeal, so his claim was procedurally defaulted. (Slip op. at 1-3). The Sixth Circuit reached the merits of his claim anyway, excusing the default because the jury hadn’t found the existence of aggravating factors and under Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333 (1992). The Sixth Circuit was wrong to do so, says the Supreme Court.