On Point: B. Opinions

Juan Esquivel-Quintana v. Jefferson B. Sessions, USSC No. 16-54, 2017 WL 2322840 (May 30, 2017), reversing Esquivel-Quintana v. Lynch, 810 F.3d 1019 (6th Cir. 2016); Scotusblog page (including links to briefs and commentary)

A non-citizen convicted of an “aggravated felony” is subject to virtually automatic deportation. 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii). One of the crimes listed as an aggravated felony is “sexual abuse of a minor.” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(A). In this case the Supreme Court holds that “in the context of statutory rape offenses that criminalize sexual intercourse based solely on the age of the participants, the generic federal definition of sexual abuse of a minor requires that the victim be younger than 16.” (Slip op. at 4). Because Esquivel-Quintana was convicted under a statute prohibiting sexual intercourse with a victim under the age of 18, he was not convicted of “sexual abuse of a minor” for purposes of the Immigration and Naturalization Act.

Nelson v. Colorado, USSC No. 15-526, (April 20, 2017), reversing and remanding Colorado v. Nelson, 364 P.3d 866 (2015); SCOTUSblog page (inlcuding links to briefs and commentary).

This decision establishes that a State cannot force an exonerated defendant to file a civil suit and prove his innocence by clear and convincing evidence in order to recover costs, fees, and restitution he paid upon conviction.

Manrique v. United States, USSC No. 15-7250, 2017 WL 1390728 (April 19, 2017), affirming United States v. Manrique, 618 Fed. App. 579 (11th Cir. 2016); Scotusblog page (including links to briefs and commentary)

Lawyers handling federal criminal appeals, take note: This decision holds that, to challenge a deferred restitution order under the Mandatory Victim Restitution Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3664(d)(5), that is entered in an amended judgment issued after the defendant has filed a notice of appeal, the defendant must file a second notice of appeal from the amended judgment containing the restitution amount.

The Texas court had applied what’s been called “the Lennie standard”; today the high Court holds that this test disregards current medical standards and is thus invalid. For more, see our post on the cert grant.

Elijah Manuel v. City of Joliet, Illinois, USSC No. 14-9496, 2017WL1050976 (March 21, 2017), reversing and remanding Manuel v. Illinois, 590 FedAppx. 641 (7th Cir. 2015)(unpublished); SCOTUSblog page (including links to briefs and commentary)

This decision is noteworthy for two reasons. First, it’s a reminder that when something goes very wrong in your client’s case he or she could have a civil rights claim under 42 U.S.C. §1983. Second, it  brought the 7th Circuit in line with 10 other circuits, which hold that the 4th Amendment right to be free from seizure unless there’s probable cause extends through the pretrial period.

Miguel Angel Peña-Rodriguez v. Colorado, USSC No. 15-606, 2017 WL 855760 (March 6, 2017), reversing Peña-Rodriguez v. People, 350 P.3d 287 (Colo. 2015); Scotusblog page

Every state and federal jurisdiction has some version of the “no-impeachment rule,” which, after a verdict is received, bars an aggrieved party from presenting testimony by jurors regarding the jury’s deliberations. SCOTUS has twice upheld such rules against constitutional challenge, while allowing that there could be certain cases in which refusing to permit such testimony would be too harmful to justice. The court now decides that the no-impeachment rule must give way to the Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury where “a juror makes a clear statement that indicates he or she relied on racial stereotypes or animus to convict a criminal defendant.”

Travis Beckless v. United States, USSC No. 15-8544, 2017 WL 855781 (March 6, 2017), affirming Beckles v. United States, 616 Fed. Appx. 415 (11th Cir. 2015) (unpublished); Scotusblog page (including links to briefs and commentary)

The Supreme Court holds that provisions in the federal advisory sentencing guidelines are not subject to vagueness challenges under the Due Process Clause.

Michael Damon Rippo v. Renee Baker, Warden, USSC No. 16-6316, 2017 WL 855913 (March 6, 2017) (per curiam), reversing and remanding Rippo v. State, 368 P.3d 729 (Nev. 2016); Scotusblog page

In this per curiam decision, the Supreme Court holds the lower court erred in demanding a defendant show actual bias to satisfy his claim that his due process right to an impartial judge was violated.

Buck v. Davis, USSC No. 15-8049, 2017 WL 685534 (February 22, 2017), reversing and remanding Buck v. Stephens, 623 Fed. Appx. 668 (5th Cir. 2015) (unpublished); Scotusblog page (including links to briefs and commentary)

Buck was found guilty of capital murder. Under state law, the jury could impose a death sentence only if it found Buck was likely to commit acts of violence in the future. At sentencing Buck’s attorney called Walter Quijano, a psychologist, to give an opinion on that issue. Though the psychologist testified Buck probably would not engage in violent conduct, he also said that race is one factor in assessing a person’s propensity for violence and that Buck was statistically more likely to act violently because he is black. The jury sentenced Buck to death. The Supreme Court, by a 7-to-2 vote, holds Buck’s attorney was ineffective.

Lawrence Shaw v. United States, USSC No. 15-5991, 2016 WL 7182235 (December 12, 2016), vacating and remanding United States v. Shaw, 781 F.3d 1130 (9th Cir. 2015); Scotusblog page (including links to briefs and commentary)

A unanimous Supreme Court holds that to be found guilty of bank fraud under 18 U.S.C. § 1344(1), which prohibits “knowingly execut[ing] a scheme … to defraud a financial institution” does not require proof the defendant intended that the financial institution—rather than, say, one of its depositors—be the principal victim of the fraud.