On Point blog, page 27 of 133
SCOW: Judge’s failure to give mandated immigration warning was harmless
State v. Jose Alberto Reyes Fuerte, 2017 WI 104, reversing a published court of appeals decision, 12/19/17; case activity (including briefs)
A judge taking a guilty or no contest plea is required by § 971.08(1)(c) to warn the defendant that if he or she is not a U.S. citizen the plea might result in deportation, inadmissibility, or denial of naturalization. If the judge doesn’t comply with § 971.08(1)(c) and the defendant shows the plea is likely to result in one of those immigration consequences, the defendant can move to withdraw the plea under § 971.08(2). State v. Douangmala, 2002 WI 62, 253 Wis. 2d 173, 646 N.W.2d 1, held that harmless error principles don’t apply to § 971.08(2), so the defendant is entitled to withdraw the plea even if the state claims the defendant actually knew the immigration consequences. This decision overrules Douangmala and holds that the judge’s failure to comply with § 971.08(1)(c) in Reyes Fuerte’s case was harmless.
SCOW suspends defense lawyer for lying and forging a court order
OLR v. Michael D. Petersen, 2016AP563-D, 12/15/17 (case activity )
I am a crook. I am a cheat. I am a thief. I am a liar. I was convicted of a crime on November 9th, 2015. My conviction resulted from my intentional choice to sell my own clients down the river and then trying to cover it up. You may not hire me or have me legally represent you in any fashion until you read the Criminal Complaint and Judgment of Conviction in my Outagamie County Wisconsin Case No. 15CM878. This disclosure is required as one of the conditions of my probation. Op. ¶34
Do we have your attention?
SCOW to address challenge to muddled jury instructions on self defense, accident
State v. Joseph T. Langlois, 2016AP1409-CR, petition for review of a published court of appeals decision granted 12/13/17; case activity (including briefs)
Issues (composed by On Point):
1. Was trial counsel ineffective for failing to object to the jury instructions for self defense and accident on the lesser included charge of homicide by negligent handling of a dangerous weapon?
2. Alternatively, is a new trial in the interest of justice warranted because the erroneous jury instructions on self defense and accident prevented the real controversy from being tried?
3. Did the erroneous instructions on self defense and accident violate due process by relieving the state of the burden to prove every element of the offense?
4. Was the evidence sufficient to support the jury’s verdict of guilty of homicide by negligent handling of a dangerous weapon?
SCOW ducks First Amendment question
State v. Ginger Breitzman, 2017 WI 100, 12/1/17, affirming an unpublished court of appeals decision; case activity (including briefs)
Breitzman was convicted at trial of several counts of child abuse (for physical assaults) and neglect of her son, J.K. She was also convicted of a charge of disorderly conduct for an incident inside their home in which she called him a “fuck face,” a “retard,” and a “piece of shit.” The lead issue is whether her trial lawyer was ineffective for not trying to get the DC dismissed because her words were protected by the First Amendment. The court refuses to decide.
SCOW to decide whether courts may impose criminal penalty where suspect refuses a warrantless blood draw
State v. Patrick H. Dalton, 2016AP2483-CR, petition for review 0f an unpublished court of appeals opinion granted 11/13/17; case activity (including briefs)
Issues:
1. Under Missouri v. McNeely and Birchfield v. North Dakota, may a circuit court impose a harsher criminal punishment because a defendant exercised his constitutional right to refuse a warrantless blood draw?
2. Whether Dalton was denied the effective assistance of counsel where his attorney failed to move to suppress blood evidence on grounds that police lacked exigent circumstances to forcibly draw his blood without a warrant?
SCOW will address State’s request that it overrule State v. Hess’s limit on good-faith exception to exclusionary rule
State v. Christopher John Kerr, 2016AP2455-CR, petition for bypass granted 10/17/17; case activity (including briefs)
Issue (based on the parties’ court of appeals briefs)
Does the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule apply when there is no misconduct by a law enforcement officer in arresting an individual on an active commitment order that is later found to be void ab initio?
SCOW will decide if lifetime GPS monitoring is a penalty that judge must cover during plea colloquy
State v. DeAnthony K. Muldrow, 2017 WI App 47, petition for review granted 10/17/17; case activity (including briefs)
Issue (composed by On Point)
Does lifetime GPS monitoring mandated under § 301.48 constitute “punishment,” thus requiring a judge to advise a defendant that he or she will be subject to the monitoring as a consequence of a guilty or no contest plea?
SCOW to decide whether “mandatory” DNA surcharges can be waived
State v. Michael L. Cox, 2016AP1745-CR, certification granted 10/17/17; case activity (including briefs)
Issue (from certification):
This case raises a single question: whether a sentencing court retains any discretion under Wis. Stat. § 973.046 (2015-16), to waive DNA surcharges for crimes committed after January 1, 2014.
SCOW will review how court of appeals decide prejudice under Strickland in multi-count cases
State v. Lamont Donnell Sholar, 2016AP987, petition for review granted 10/17/17; case activity (including briefs)
Issues (composed by On Point)
1. When assessing the prejudice of defense counsel’s deficient performance in a multiple-count jury trial, may a court divide the prejudice analysis on a count-by-count basis, finding prejudice warranting relief on some counts from the single trial but not others?
2. If a party fails to file a petition for review following an unfavorable Court of Appeals ruling on a particular argument, may the party re-litigate the same question in a second appeal of the same case?
SCOW will address whether mandatory DNA surcharge violates ex post facto clause
State v. Jamal L. Williams, 2017 WI App 46, cross petitions for review granted 10/10/17; case activity (including briefs)
Issues (composed by On Point)
1. Is the imposition of a single mandatory $250 DNA surcharge an ex post facto violation with respect to a defendant who committed his offense when the surcharge was discretionary and who previously had provided a DNA sample in another case?
2. Is Jamal Williams entitled to resentencing because the circuit court sentenced him based on an improper factor, namely, the fact that Williams refused to stipulate to restitution for which he was not legally responsible?