On Point: 45. WI Supreme Court

State v. Tydis Trinard Odom, 2015AP2525-CR, certification granted 9/12/17; case activity (including briefs). This is the second certification of this case; here’s the first.

Issue

In determining whether the imposition of multiple DNA surcharges constitutes “potential punishment” under WIS. STAT. § 971.08(1)(a) so that a court must advise a defendant about the surcharges before a valid plea may be taken, is the “intent-effects” test, as applied in State v. Radaj, 2015 WI App 50, 363 Wis. 2d 633, 866 N.W.2d 758, and State v. Scruggs, 2017 WI 15, 373 Wis. 2d 312, 891 N.W.2d 786, to ex post facto claims, the same analysis that was applied in State v. Bollig, 2000 WI 6, ¶16, 232 Wis. 2d 561, 605 N.W.2d 199, to a plea withdrawal claim?

If the analysis is the same, should Radaj be overruled in light of the supreme court’s recent decision in Scruggs?

We note that we previously certified the issue of whether multiple DNA surcharges constituted “potential punishment” under WIS. STAT. § 971.08(1)(a), such that a court’s failure to advise a defendant about them before taking his or her plea establishes a prima facie showing that the defendant’s plea was unknowing, involuntary, and unintelligent. The supreme court declined to accept certification.

We certify again because, as explained below, the supreme court’s recent decision in Scruggs now suggests that the ex post facto analysis of Radaj, holding that multiple DNA surcharges are “punishment,” was incorrect.

Jeremy Perri guests posts on State v. Adam M. Blackman, 2017 WI 77, 7/7/17, reversing a published court of appeals opinion, 2016 WI App 69, 371 Wis. 2d 635, 886 N.W.2d 94; case activity (including briefs)

SCOW suppresses blood test, holding that the statutory Informing the Accused misrepresented the consequences of a refusal, the consent was coerced, and the exclusionary rule is necessary to deter future violations.

Mike Tobin guest posts on State v. Lewis O. Floyd, Jr., 2017 WI 78, 7/7/17, affirming a published court of appeals opinion, 371 Wis. 2d 404; case activity (including briefs)

The majority opinion affirms the rulings of the lower courts that the defendant voluntarily consented to a frisk of his person following a traffic stop. The majority reached its decision without discussing the reasonableness of the officer’s suspicion of criminal activity-an issue emphasized in the dissenting opinion and previously analyzed by the court of appeals.

State v. Navdeep S. Brar, 2017 WI 73, 7/6/17,  affirming an unpublished court of appeals opinion, 2015AP1261-CR; case activity (including briefs)

By obtaining a driver’s license or operating a vehicle in Wisconsin do we automatically give the government consent to draw our blood without a warrant? A nose count reveals the answer remains “maybe.”

State v. Kenneth M. Asboth, Jr., 2017 WI 76, 7/6/2017, affirming an unpublished court of appeals decision; case activity (including briefs)

This case presented an issue that has divided federal and state appellate courts: does Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367 (1987), permit “community caretaker”-type vehicle impoundments only when the police act accord to “standard criteria”? The majority in this case joins the “no” camp; the dissent says the majority has “buck[ed] the nationwide trend” and expanded the community caretaker doctrine into a “pretext to engage in unconstitutional searches” for evidence of crime.

State v. Ernesto E. Lazo Villamil, 2017 WI 74, 7/6/17, affirming a published court of appeals decision; case activity (including briefs)

A few years ago the legislature set out to create a graduated penalty scheme for operating after revocation offenses, but it bungled the job and ended up creating misdemeanor and felony penalties for the offense of causing death while knowingly operating after revocation. The supreme court rebuffs Villamil’s claims that under the rule of lenity only the misdemeanor penalty can be imposed or, in the alternative, that creating two very different penalties for the same crime violates due process and equal protection. The court agrees with his request for resentencing, however, because the circuit court failed to consider the statutorily mandated sentencing factors.

State v. Raymond L. Nieves, 2017 WI 69, 6/29/17, reversing an unpublished court of appeals opinion, 2014AP1623-CR; case activity (including briefs)

Forget the old saws that “appellate courts decide cases on the narrowest possible grounds,” “appellate courts should not reach constitutional issues when another issue is dispositive,” and “the supreme court should not decide issues forfeited in the court of appeals.” They don’t constrain SCOW here. Indeed, the majority opinion rushes past the plain language of §971.12(3) in order to decide a major Confrontation Clause issue and to reverse a big defense win in the court of appeals.

State v. Keimonte Antoine Wilson, Sr., 2017 WI 63, 6/22/17, reversing a per curiam court of appeals decision; case activity (including briefs)

The supreme court holds that the provisions of § 885.03 govern service of a subpoenas in criminal cases, not the provisions of § 805.07.

State v. Lazaro Ozuna, 2017 WI 64, 6/22/17, affirming an unpublished court of appeals opinion; case activity (including briefs)

Lazaro Ozuna, a teenager, pled to two misdemeanors and got probation. The court also ordered that the convictions be expunged on successful completion of probation under Wis. Stat. § 973.015. Ozuna got through probation and was discharged, but he picked up an underage drinking ticket along the way–a violation of the no-drink condition of his probation but obviously not a terribly serious one. So, did he “successfully complete” his probation so as to be entitled to expunction?

State v. Heather L. Steinhardt, 2017 WI 62, 6/21/17, affirming a per curiam court of appeals opinion; case activity (including briefs)

Steinhardt led her 12 year old daughter to her bedroom so that her husband (the child’s step father) could have sex with her. In fact, Steinhardt sat on the bed while the assault occurred. The majority holds that leading the daughter to the assault and sitting on the bed during the assault are 2 different acts supporting 3 different crimes and punishments. Justice Abrahamson (joined by A.W. Bradley) calls Steinhardt’s crimes “revolting and detestable” but insists the “constitutional guarantees against double jeopardy protect us all, even Heather Steinhardt.” Dissent ¶47.