On Point: B. Opinions

State v. A.L. , 2019 WI 20, affirming a published court of appeals decision, 2017 WI App 72; case activity

This appeal centers on the proper interpretation of §938.30(5)(d) and §938.13 governing juveniles found not competent during a delinquency proceeding. SCOW holds a circuit court may resume suspended juvenile delinquency proceedings to reexamine the competency of a juvenile who was initially found not competent and not likely to become competent within the statutory period. It also holds that circuit courts retain competency over juvenile delinquency proceedings even after the accompanying JIPS order has expired.

Garza v. Idaho, USSC No. 17-1026, reversing Garza v. State, 405 P.3d 576 (Idaho 2017);  Scotusblog page (includes links to briefs and commentary)

This case involved two plea agreements that included clauses stating that Garza waived his right to appeal. After sentencing, Garza told his lawyer that he wanted to appeal, but his lawyer refused due to the plea agreement. Garza filed claim for ineffective assistance of counsel. Siding with Garza, SCOTUS held that counsel performed deficiently and that “prejudiced is presumed” because the failure to file a notice of appeal deprived Garza of an appeal altogether. Opinion at 1. 

State v. Gary Lee Wayerski, 2019 WI 11, affirming and modifying an unpublished court of appeals decision; case activity (including briefs)

The supreme court overrules Wisconsin’s longstanding test for deciding whether the state has “suppressed” favorable evidence in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), saying the test is unsupported by and contrary to Brady and the U.S. Supreme Court’s decisions applying Brady.

State v. Shawn T. Wiskerchen, 2019 WI 1, 1/4/19, affirming an unpublished court of appeals decision, 2016AP1541; case activity (including briefs)

This could have turned out worse. The court of appeals, as we noted in our post on that court’s decision, held that Wiskerchen, convicted of a single burglary of a home, could be made to pay restitution for his alleged prior burglaries of the same home, even though those alleged burglaries were neither charged nor read in, as the statute seems to require. Four justices now conclude, through a creative reading of the record, that the circuit court found Wiskerchen took everything in the single burglary. So, precedentially, this case amounts to little or nothing, and for now at least, the court avoids embracing the court of appeals’ view that results can precede causes.

State v. Justin A. Braunschweig, 2018 WI 113, 12/21/18, affirming an unpublished court of appeals decision; case activity (including briefs)

Braunschweig was convicted in 2011 of causing injury by intoxicated operation of a vehicle. The conviction was expunged under § 973.015. In 2016 he was charged with operating while intoxicated and with a prohibited alcohol content, both as a second offense because of the 2011 conviction. The supreme court rejects his claim that the expunged conviction can’t be a predicate offense under § 343.307(1).

State v. Faith N. Reed, 2018 WI 109, reversing an unpublished court of appeals decision, 2016AP1609; case activity (including briefs)

Here’s something not seen in a while: our state supreme court suppressing evidence because the police violated the Fourth Amendment.

State v. Johnny K. Pinder, 2018 WI 106, 11/16/18, on certification from the court of appeals; 2017AP208; case activity (including briefs)

The police thought Pinder was probably the culprit in a string of burglaries, so they applied for, and got, a warrant to attach a GPS device to his car. They did not actually do the attaching, though, until 10 days after they got the warrant. This seems to run afoul of Wis. Stat. § 968.15, which together with surrounding provisions defines, authorizes and regulates the issuance of search warrants. Specifically, it says a warrant not executed within five days of issuance is “void.”

SCOW recently rejected a challenge to Wisconsin’s statutory cap on noneconomic damages for victims of medical malpractice. See Mayo v. Wisconsin Injured Patients and Families Compensation Fund, 2018 WI 78.  If you are challenging the constitutionality of  a Wisconsin statute, you may want to take a careful look at this decision.  The justices appear to have split over the proper standard for judging the constitutionality of a statute.

State v. Christopher John Kerr, 2018 WI 87, 7/6/18, reversing a circuit court order on bypass of the court of appeals; case activity (including briefs)

Wisconsin has recognized 2 grounds for applying the exclusionary rule to suppress evidence–to deter police misconduct and to ensure judicial integrity.  State v. Hess, 2010 WI 82, ¶¶20, 33, 327 Wis. 2d 524, 785 N.W.2d 568; State v. Eason, 2001 WI 98, ¶¶3, 31 n.10, 245 Wis. 2d 206, 629 N.W.2d 625. The majority opinion in this case clarifies that a judge’s failure to follow the law when issuing a warrant cannot serve as an independent basis for the exclusionary rule. 

State v. Gerald P. Mitchell, 2018 WI 84, 7/3/18, on certification from the court of appeals; 2015AP304-CR, SCOTUS cert. granted, 1/11/19, vacated and remanded, 6/29/19; case activity (including briefs)

This is the supreme court’s third attempt to decide whether provisions of Wisconsin’s implied consent law comport with the Fourth Amendment. If you’ve been following along, you might have predicted the result: no majority opinion, no binding holding, and, as the lead opinion laments, a state of confusion going forward. Briefly: the lead, 3-justice opinion says “we overrule State v. Padley,” a court of appeals decision addressing a related (though not identical) issue, but it in fact does no such thing: it seems, in fact, to echo much of the discussion in Padley, and anyway, it’s a three-justice minority, and can’t overrule anything. A two-justice concurrence says the legislature can’t legislate away a motorist’s right to refuse consent to a search, but would hold that a blood draw of an unconscious OWI suspect doesn’t require a warrant anyway, despite a pretty clear statement to the contrary from SCOTUS. And a two-justice dissent also says the implied consent law doesn’t equal constitutional consent. So, just as in State v. Hager from this term, you have a result that favors the state, even though a majority of justices disagree with the state’s constitutional argument.