On Point blog, page 5 of 30
SCOW to address timing of jury demands for Chapter 51 final hearings
Waukesha County v. E.J.W., 2020AP370, petition for review granted 2/26/21, reversed, 2021 WI 85; case activity
Issue for review:
Section 51.20(11) provides that the subject of a commitment proceeding must demand a jury trial 48 hours in advance of the time set for the final hearing. When the court adjourns the hearing for good cause to appoint new counsel, does that reset the 48 hours for demanding a jury trial?
SCOW will review rape shield law’s exclusion of victim’s lack of sexual conduct
State v. Ryan Hugh Mulhern, 2019AP1565-CR, petition to review granted 1/20/21; reversed 6/21/22; case activity (including PFR and briefs)
Issue presented (from the state’s PFR)
Does § 972.11(2)(b), the “rape shield” statute, bar relevant evidence of the complainant’s lack of sexual conduct when the state offers the evidence to corroborate the complainant’s allegation of sexual assault and the evidence is not prejudicial to the complainant or the defendant and causes none of the harms the rape shield law is intended to protect against?
SCOW to address admissibility of un-Mirandized statements
State v. Manuel Garcia, 2018AP2319-CR, petition for review granted 1/20/21; case activity
Issue for review: (adapted from the State’s PFR and the COA’s opinion):
Whether the State may invoke the impeachment exception to the exclusionary rule during its case-in-chief and thereby use a defendant’s statement, taken in violation of Miranda, to rehabilitate one of its witnesses?
SCOW to review sentence credit for Wisconsin offenders doing time in other states
State v. Cesar Antonio Lira, 2019AO691-CR, petition for review granted 1/20/21; case activity
Issues presented (from the State’s PFR):
1. Under §973.155, a convicted offender is entitled to sentence credit for “all days spent in custody in connection with the course of conduct for which sentence was imposed.” And §973.15(5) provides that an offender lawfully made available to another jurisdiction is entitled to credit for custody time in that jurisdiction “under the terms of s. 973.155.”
The court of appeals awarded Lira over 11 years of credit for custody in Oklahoma under §973.15(5), despite the fact that the Oklahoma sentence was not “in connection with” the Wisconsin offenses for which he was sentenced. It relied on State v. Brown, 2006 WI App 41, 289 Wis. 2d 823, 711 N.W.2d 708, which holds that courts determining credit under section 973.15(5) may not consider “the terms of s. 973.155,” including whether the custody in the other jurisdiction is “in connection with” the Wisconsin offense.
SCOW accepts case raising issue of using lawful gun ownership as an aggravating sentencing factor
State v. Octavia W. Dodson, 2018AP1476-CR, petition for review granted 1/20/21; case activity (including briefs)
Issue presented:
Did the sentencing court violate Dodson’s Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms by considering his status as a lawful gun owner an aggravating factor at sentencing?
SCOW to address Miranda custody during a Terry stop
State v. Brian v. Rotolo, 2019AP2061-CR, petition for review granted 12/28/20; case activity
Issue presented (adapted from the petition for review):
In State v. Lonkoski, 2013 WI 30, ¶6, 346 Wis. 2d 523, 828 N.W.2d 552, SCOW held that the test for Fifth Amendment Miranda custody is whether “a reasonable person would not feel free to terminate the interview and leave the scene.” Does this test for determining Miranda custody also apply when police legally detain a suspect under Terry?
SCOW to address child pornography surcharge
State v. Anthony M. Schmidt, 2020AP616-CR, petition for bypass granted 12/28/20; case activity
- Does Wis. Stat. §973.042 (the child pornography surcharge statute) permit the circuit court to impose a child pornography surcharge for an offense that is “read in” for sentencing purposes?
- Is the child pornography surcharge a punishment that must be explained during a plea colloquy? If so, was Schmidt entitled to a hearing on his claim that the plea colloquy was deficient in this case?
SCOW to address 48-hour deadline for filing Chapter 51 examiners’ report
Fond du Lac County v. S.N.W., 2019AP2073, petition for review granted 11/19/20; case activity
Issues presented:
1. Did the circuit court lack competency to adjudicate this Chapter 51 commitment proceeding due to the county’s violation of the rule requiring it to file psychiatric reports 48 hours before the final hearing?
2. If the circuit court retained competency, did it err in admitting a tardy report and the testimony of the report’s author?
SCOW to address important cell phone search issues
State v. George Steven Burch, 2019AP404-CR, certification granted 11/18/20; case activity (including briefs)
Issues presented (from the certification):
Did police violate Burch’s Fourth Amendment rights by:
- exceeding the scope of Burch’s consent to search his cell phone by downloading the phone’s entire contents, rather than only the text messages;
- unlawfully retaining the entire cell phone download after it completed its initial investigation and closing the case without charging Burch; and
- unlawfully conducting a second search of the cell phone download months after closing the initial investigation.
SCOW to decide constitutional challenge regarding the continuing CHIPS ground for a TPR
Eau Claire County DHS v. S.E., 2019AP894, review of a published opinion granted 10/21/20, case activity.
When the court orders a child in need of protection or services (“CHIPS”) placed outside the family home, a parent’s rights may be terminated if he or she fails to meet the conditions for the child’s return in the timeframe set out by statute. Wis. Stat. § 48.415(2)(a). In April 2018, the legislature shortened this timeframe. Under either version, the CHIPS order placing the child outside the home must include “notice” of “any grounds for termination of parental rights[.]” Wis. Stat. §§ 48.415(2)(a) and
48.356.
Issues for Review:
Whether as a matter of statutory construction the new, shorter timeframe begins with the initial CHIPS order, even if it predates the change in the statute and thus does not include notice of the shorter timeframe.
Whether starting the shorter timeframe with a CHIPS order that predates the statutory change violates a parent’s due process rights.