On Point: A. Review Grants

State v. Leevan Roundtree, 2018AP594-CR, review of per curiam opinion granted, 1/14/20; case activity

Issues:

1. Section 941.29(2) prohibits any person convicted of a felony—even if it doesn’t involve physical violence–from possessing firearms the rest of his life. Is this statute unconstitutional as applied to a person convicted of failure to pay child support?

2. Does a guilty plea waive a claim that the statute of conviction is unconstitutional as applied?

State v. Dobbs, 2018AP319-CR, petition for review of a per curiam opinion granted 1/14/20; case activity (including briefs)

Issues (based on Dobbs’ petition for review and SCOW’s order granting review:

1. Did the trial court err in precluding the defense’s expert on false confessions from testifying where, consistent with State v. Smith, 2016 WI App 8, 366 Wis. 2d 613, 874 N.W.2d 610, his opinions were relevant to a material issue, but he would not be offering an opinion on the specific facts of the case?

2. Did the trial court err in allowing Mr. Dobbs’ statements to law enforcement into evidence despite the delay in reading him his Miranda rights and because his statements were involuntary due to his mental and physical conditions?

3. Whether the court of appeals’ decision that Dobbs was in custody for purposes of Miranda warnings is consistent with State v. Morgan, 2002 WI App 124, 254 Wis. 2d 602, 648 N.W.2d 23. If not, whether Morgan should be overruled?

State v. Ryan M. Muth, 2019AP875-CR, petition for review of per curiam opinion granted 12/11/19; case activity (including briefs)

Issues presented (based on petition and  cross-petition for review):

1. Wisconsin’s marital property statutes provide that income accrued during marriage belongs to both spouses. Wisconsin’s restitution statute permits crime victims to recover “income lost” from the “filing of charges or cooperating in the investigation and prosecution of the crime.” Where a crime causes a person’s death, can the deceased person’s adult children recover their spouse’s lost income  as restitution?

2. Where crime victims accept a civil settlement for lost wages and expenses, and the victims also seek restitution for lost wages and expenses, and where the defendant asserts “accord and sanctification,” does the defendant have to produce “extrinsic evidence” showing that the wages and expenses the victim received in the civil settlement are the same wages and expenses the victim seeks as criminal restitution?

State v. David Gutierrez, 2017AP2364-CR, petition for review of a published court of appeals decision granted 11/13/19; case activity (including briefs)

Issue (based on the State’s Petition for Review):

1. Did the court of appeals violate the standard of appellate review of trial court evidentiary rulings by holding the trial court erred in deciding to exclude evidence offered by the defendant that DNA from other men was found on the clothing of the complainant in a child sexual assault prosecution?

2. Did the court of appeals improperly apply Wis. Stat. § 972.11(2)(b), Wisconsin’s rape shield law, when it held the defendant was not offering the DNA evidence as evidence concerning the victim’s prior sexual conduct?

State ex rel. Milton Eugene Warren v. Michael Meisner, 2019AP567-W, petition for review granted 10/16/19; reversed and remanded 6/10/20; case activity

Issue (composed by On Point based on the petition for review)

Whether under State v. Starks, 2013 WI 69, Warren’s § 974.06 postconviction motion alleging ineffective assistance of counsel by the lawyer appointed on direct appeal should be heard in the circuit court or the Court of Appeals.

State v. Courtney C. Brown, 2019 WI App 34, petition for review granted 10/15/19; case activity (including links to briefs)

Issues (petition for review)

Whether police unlawfully extended a noncriminal traffic stop beyond its initial purpose?

State v. Ulanda M. Green, 2018AP1350-CR, petition for review granted 9/3/19; case activity (including briefs)

Issues:

1. Whether law enforcement’s “dialogue” with Green amounted to an “interrogation” that should have been preceded by a Miranda warning?

2. Whether Green invoked her right to remain silent when law enforcement asked her if she would like to make a statement and she responded: “No. I don’t know nothing.”

Waukesha County v. J.J.H., 2018AP168, petition for review granted 9/3/19, case activity

Issues:

1.  Whether the mootness doctrine should apply to an appeal from a commitment order?

2. Whether the circuit court violated due process when it held a Chapter 51 probable cause hearing and ordered a 30-day commitment/temporary guardianship/protective placement under §51.67 without providing J.J.H., who is deaf, sign language interpreters?

3. Whether the circuit court erred in entering a §51.67 conversion order (a) at the probable cause stage of a Chapter 51 commitment and (b) without making any of the statutorily-required findings for the order?

4. What is the mechanism for appealing a §51.67 order?

State v. Richard H. Harrison Jr., 2017AP2440 & 2441-CR, cross-petitions for review granted 8/14/19; case activity

We posted about the unpublished court of appeals decision; the basic scenario is that Mr. Harrison served his initial confinement on a couple of concurrent sentences, then began serving the initial confinement portion of some sentences that had been imposed consecutive to that first set of sentences. But, about three years into those later sentences, they were vacated. So what happens to the three years Harrison was in prison on sentences that no longer exist? Do they count toward satisfying the extended supervision of his still-extant, earlier-imposed sentences?

Timothy W. Miller v. Angela L. Carroll, petition to review a published court of appeals decision granted 8/14/19; case activity (including briefs)

Issues (based on Carroll’s Petition for Review)

1. Does a judge’s acceptance of one party’s Facebook “friend” request by itself overcome the presumption that a judge is fair, impartial, and capable of ignoring any biasing influences, given the absence of any allegation of subjective bias or of facts showing the judge treated the other party unfairly, and when there were no electronic social media (“ESM”) communications between the judge and the party regarding the merits of the case?
2. Does the fact a party “liked” a judge’s Facebook posts unrelated to the pending litigation or commented on a Facebook post unrelated to the pending litigation constitute an ex parte communication between a party and a judge?