On Point

The answer depends on how you define “polarized” and your reference point. Today’s edition of SCOWstats presents Part 2 of “Wisconsin v. Minnesota–Comparing the Supreme Courts.” Find out whether the Badgers or the Gophers win this battle here.

Questions presented:

Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015) found the residual clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(B)(ii)(defining “violent felony”) unconstitutionally vague. That clause is identical to the residual cause in the career-offender provision of the United States Sentencing Guidelines, U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(2)(defining “crime of violence”)

(1) Whether Johnson v. United States applies retroactively to collateral cases challenging federal sentences enhanced under the residual clause in United States Sentencing Guidelines (U.S.S.G.) § 4B1.2(a)(2) (defining “crime of violence”);

(2) whether Johnson‘s constitutional holding applies to the residual clause in U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(2), thereby rendering challenges to sentences enhanced under it cognizable on collateral review; and

(3) whether mere possession of a sawed-off shotgun, an offense listed as a “crime of violence” only in commentary to U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2, remains a “crime of violence” after Johnson.

State v. Tory C. Johnson, 2015AP1322-CR, 6/28/2016, District 1 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Tory Johnson raises various challenges to his jury-trial conviction for resisting an officer causing substantial bodily harm.

Voisine v. United States, USSC No. 14-10154, 2016 WL 3461559, 579 U.S. ___ (June 27, 2016), affirming United States v. Voisine, 778 F.3d 176 (1st Cir. 2015); Scotusblog page (includes links to briefs and commentary)

Federal law prohibits any person convicted of a “misdemeanor crime of domestic violence” from possessing a firearm. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9). That phrase is defined to include any misdemeanor committed against a domestic relation that necessarily involves the “use … of physical force.” 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(33)(A). Resolving a question that United States v. Castleman, 134 S. Ct. 1405, 1414 n.8 (2014), left unanswered, the Court, by a 5-to-2 vote, holds that misdemeanor assault convictions for reckless conduct (as contrasted to knowing or intentional conduct) trigger the statutory firearms ban.

McDonnell v. United States, USSC No. 15-474, 2016 WL 3461561 (June 27, 2016), reversing United States v. McDonnell, 792 F.3d 478 (4th Cir. 2015); Scotusblog page (includes links to briefs and commentary)

While he was governor of Virginia, Bob McDonnell, along with his wife, accepted gifts and favors worth about $175,000 from a businessman who was trying to get the state medical schools to run studies on a nutritional supplement his company had developed. As discussed in our post on the cert grant, a jury convicted McDonnell of various honest services fraud and extortion counts in relation to various actions he undertook related to the supplement, including arranging and attending meetings with other government officials about the supplement and hosting a private lunch with the businessman at which checks were given to university researchers.

Birchfield v. North Dakota, USSC No. 14-1468, 2016 WL 3434398 (June 23, 2016), reversing State v. Birchfield, 858 N.W.2d 302 (N.D. 2015); vacating and remanding State v. Beylund, 861 N.W.2d 172 (N.D. 2015); and affirming State v. Bernard, 844 N.W.2d 41 (Minn. 2014); Scotusblog pages: Birchfield, Beylund, Bernard (include links to briefs and commentary)

Three years ago, in Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552 (2013), the Court rejected a bright-line rule that police may always conduct a warrantless alcohol test on a motorist they have probable cause to believe is driving drunk, pursuant to the exigent circumstances exception. In these three cases, the Court adopts a bright-line rule that the police may always conduct a warrantless alcohol test on a motorist they have arrested for driving drunk, pursuant to the search incident to arrest exception. But they can only Conduct a test of the motorist’s breath, and not the motorist’s blood. Make sense?

Richard Mathis v. United States, USSC No. 15-6092, 2016 WL 343440, 579 U.S. ___ (June 23, 2016), reversing United States v. Mathis, 786 F.3d 1068 (8th Cir. 2015); Scotusblog page (includes links to briefs and commentary)

In this decision the Court, by a 5-to-3 vote, reaffirms its long-standing rule that the “categorical approach,” which focuses on the elements of an offense, is to be used in determining whether a prior conviction enhances a federal offender’s sentence under the Armed Career Criminal Act. It also rejects the Government’s argument for an exception to that approach when the defendant is convicted under a statute that lists multiple, alternative factual means of satisfying one of the elements of the offense. While the decision obviously affects federal criminal practice, it may also affect a recent decision of the Wisconsin Supreme Court.

State v. Loomis, which SCOW will soon decide, is being closely watched around the country. The case challenges the sentencing court’s use of an algorithm to predict the defendant’s risk of reoffending. Today’s New York Times discusses Loomis and notes that algorithms also use predictive data to decide which streets to patrol, to compile lists […]

State v. Antonio D. Barbeau, 2016 WI App 51; case activity (including briefs)

Barbeau killed his great-grandmother when he was 14 years old, and eventually pled no contest to first-degree intentional homicide, which carries an automatic life sentence. When imposing such a sentence, the court must make a decision as to extended supervision: it can either deny any possibility of ES, or it can set a date at which the person becomes eligible, though such date must occur after the person has served at least 20 years. Wis. Stat. § 973.014(1g).

State v. David L. Vickers, 2015AP1631-CR, 6/22/16, District 2 (not recommended for publication); case activity, including briefs

Vickers, who was convicted of misdemeanor bail jumping and retail theft of a wireless router, filed a §974.06 motion claiming ineffective assistance of counsel because his trial lawyer failed to move for suppression of stolen property found in his car and failed to investigate or call as a witness a co-defendant who later confessed to the theft. The court of appeals here affirms the convcition.