On Point

James R. Todd v. Kess Roberson, 7th Circuit Cout of Appeals Case No. 14-3430, 2016 WL 3568107, 7/1/16

Todd claims his trial lawyer was ineffective for inducing him to plead to a charge carrying a minimum of 6 years and a maximum of 60 years in exchange for the state capping its sentencing recommendation at 10 years when there was no such cap. His claim fails because the record shows he understood there was no 10-year cap.

Anastazia Schmid v. Steven McCauley, 7th Circuit Court of Appeals No. 14-2974, 2016 WL 3190670, 6/8/16

Because the record discloses Schmid suffers from some sort of mental disability and may have been hindered by counsel’s failure, the district court acted too hastily in dismissing Schmid’s untimely habeas petition; instead it should have appointed counsel and, if necessary, held an evidentiary hearing to determine whether Schmid’s deadline was subject to equitable tolling.

Eric Blackmon v. Tarry Williams, 7th Circuit Court of Appeals No. 14-3059, 2016 WL 3007212, 5/24/16

Two eyewitnesses to the murder of Tony Cox were shown a photo array and live line-up, and both independently identified Eric Blackmon—a man they did not know—as one of two gunmen who shot and killed Cox. The judge at Blackmon’s bench trial relied heavily on the two eyewitness identifications. (Slip op. at 3-11). While Blackmon’s trial lawyer put on two alibi witnesses, Blackmon alleges he failed to interview and present six additional alibi witnesses. The Seventh Circuit holds this allegation entitles Blackmon to a hearing to take testimony from the missing alibi witnesses and trial counsel.

State v. Mastella L. Jackson, 2016 WI 56, 7/1/16, affirming a published decision of the court of appeals, 2015 WI App 49, 363 Wis. 2d 553, 866 N.W.2d 768; case activity (including briefs)

Despite the “flagrant” and “reprehensible” violations of Jackson’s Fifth Amendment rights by police, the supreme court holds that physical evidence seized based in part on information obtained from those violations should not be suppressed because the evidence would have been inevitably discovered. In the course of this ruling, the court alters Wisconsin’s long-established inevitable discovery standard and refuses to rule out using the doctrine in cases where the police intentionally violate a suspect’s rights.

The countdown to SCOW’s final decision this term continues. As of today, there are 9 to go, with 3 scheduled to be released on Wednesday July 6th. One particular case is attracting a lot of national attention: State v. Loomis, which concerns a circuit court’s ability to rely on COMPAS assessments when imposing a sentence. In […]

Rashaad A. Imani v. William Pollard, 7th Circuit Court of Appeals No. 14-3407, 2016 WL 3434673, 6/22/16

Imani tried to exercise his right to self-representation under Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975), but the Wisconsin trial judge prevented him from doing so. In State v. Imani, 2010 WI 66, 326 Wis. 2d 179, 786 N.W.2d 40, the Wisconsin Supreme Court held that the trial judge properly found Imani wasn’t competent to represent himself and that he hadn’t made a knowing and voluntary choice to represent himself. The Seventh Circuit now holds that even under the stringent standard for federal habeas relief, SCOW’s decision was wrong, and Imani is entitled to a new trial.

Last week SCOWstats posted data showing that the Wisconsin Supreme Court is more polarized than the Minnesota Supreme Court. This week SCOW goes head-to-head with SCOTUS. Find out which supreme court wins the polarization contest here.

State v. Joshua J. Hams, 2015AP2656-CR, 6/30/16, District 4; (1-judge opinion; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Don’t look down! If you do–and stutter nervously in response to questioning–the police have reasonable suspicion to extend a stop of your car for a traffic violation. So says the court of appeals in a decision that veers across the constitutional line and runs into federal case law heading the opposite direction.

State v. McKellips, 2016 WI 51, 6/28/16, reversing a published court of appeals decision, 2015 WI App 31; case activity (including briefs)

SCOW here defines the phrase “computerized communication system” by separately defining each word, and then lumping together those definitions to conclude that text messages sent with a flip phone constitute “use of a computerized communication system.” It concludes that Wis. Stat. §948.075 is understood by persons of ordinary intelligence, and is therefore not unconstitutional; and that the circuit court’s jury instructions, while not perfect, were close enough. Additionally,  SCOW reminds the court of appeals that discretionary reversals under §752.35 are only for “exceptional cases.”

State v. James D. Heidke, 2016 WI App 55; case activity (including briefs)

The state charged Heidke with one count of use of a computer to facilitate a child sex crime. Heidke moved to dismiss the penalty enhancer in §939.617(1) because it violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth and Eighth Amendments in that it has no rational basis to that crime and it is unconstitutional as applied to him.