On Point

Winnebago County v. M.O.S., 2015AP2619, District 2, 6/15/16 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

The circuit court’s oral findings at the conclusion of M.O.S.’s trial didn’t track the statutory language in either § 51.61(1)(g)4.a. or 4.b., but no matter: On the standard involuntary medication order form the court checked the box corresponding to the standard under subdivision 4.b. (¶¶4, 7), and the evidence presented at trial is sufficient to support an order under that standard, despite M.O.S’s partial understanding that his delusions are caused by mental illness.

Today’s edition of SCOWstats compares the output of the Minnesota and Wisconsin Supreme Courts. It also highlights some surprising differences between the two institutions. Click here for the full story.

State v. Brian R. Corvino, 2016 WI App 52; case activity (including briefs)

This decision examines § 967.055(2)(a), which requires the State to apply to the circuit court before amending an OWI charge. The court of appeals found that amending the charge here would be inconsistent with the public policy of deterring drunk-driving and held that the circuit court had the inherent authority to order the State to file an Information charging Corvino’s 4th OWI as a felony.

State v. Richard J. Sulla, 2016 WI 46, 6/14/16, reversing an unpublished per curiam court of appeals decision; case activity (including briefs)

Sulla entered a plea agreement requiring him to plead “no contest” to two counts and the State to dismiss and “read in” two other counts for purposes of sentencing and restitution. But after he was sentenced to 20 years of imprisonment, Sulla moved for plea withdrawal arguing that he was misinformed of, and did not understand, the effect that a read-in charge could have at sentencing. The circuit court denied the motion without a hearing. Don’t be fooled. SCOW’s decision here affects more than plea withdrawal. It changes appellate procedure.

State v. Julie C. Phillips, 2015AP927-CR, 6/14/16, District III (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

The court of appeals rejects the state’s attempt to parlay a single fact–a strong smell of unburned marijuana emanating from a house–into exigent circumstances justifying a warrantless search.

Today marks the 50th anniversary of Miranda v. Arizona. In honor of the occasion, The Marshall Project asks: For 50 years, you’ve had “the right to remain silent.” So why do so many suspects confess to crimes they did not commit? Read the full report here.

The Volokh Conspiracy sums up this case beautifully: “Nebraska drug doggie alerts on vehicle. Officers find no drugs but do find a duffel bag with many credit cards, debit cards, and gift cards. Eighth Circuit (over a dissent): No Fourth Amendment violation to scan the cards’ magnetic stripes (which revealed them to be counterfeit).” Read the decision […]

United States v. Bryant, USSC No. 15-420, 2016 WL 3221519 (June 13, 2016), reversing and remanding 769 F.3d 671 (9th Cir. 2014); Scotusblog page (includes links to briefs and commentary)

As we explained in our prior post on the cert grant in this case, the Sixth Amendment does not apply in tribal courts. Congress has created a statutory right to counsel in such courts, including for indigent defendants, in prosecutions involving prison sentences greater than one year. But for charges involving less than a year of incarceration, only defendants who can afford a lawyer are entitled to have one. Bryant has several prior domestic violence convictions in tribal court for which he was not statutorily entitled to, and did not receive, a lawyer. The question here is whether these convictions can form the predicate for his new, federal-court conviction for “domestic assault within … Indian country” which applies only to those with at least two DV priors.

Williams v. Pennsylvania, USSC No. 15-5040, 2016 WL 3189529 (June 9, 2016), vacating and remanding Commonwealth v. Williams, 105 A.3d 1234 (Pa. 2014); Scotusblog page (includes links to briefs and commentary)

When he was district attorney of Philadelphia, Ronald Castille authorized a subordinate to seek a death sentence in Terrance Williams’s murder trial. Thirty years later, as Chief Justice of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, Castille refused to recuse himself from the commonwealth’s appeal of Williams’ successful habeas petition, which alleged that the DA’s office had withheld exculpatory information contrary to Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court ruled against Williams; SCOTUS now holds that Castille’s participation in that decision deprived Williams of due process.

Dietz v. Bouldin, USSC No. 15-458, 2016WL3189528 (June 9, 2016), affirming Dietz v. Bouldin, 794 F.3d 1093 (9th Cir. 2015); SCOTUSblog page (includes links to briefs and commentary)

In a 6-2 decision, SCOTUS holds that a federal district court has limited inherent authority to rescind a jury discharge and to recall the jury for further deliberations in order to address an error in its verdict. The court specifically limits this decision to civil cases.