On Point

State v. Miguel Angel Langarica, 2015AP1546, 4/21/16, District 4 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Langarica’s misunderstanding about whether the conviction would require him to register as a sex offender under Illinois law doesn’t entitle him to withdraw his plea because he didn’t prove the misunderstanding was based on incorrect information from his trial lawyer.

Molina-Martinez v. United States, USSC No. 14-8913, 2016 WL 1574581 (April 20, 2016), reversing and remanding United States v. Molina-Martinez, 588 Fed. Appx. 333 (5th Cir. 2015); Scotusblog page (includes links to briefs and commentary)

Emphasizing the Federal Sentencing Guidelines’ “central” role in sentencing because they “serve as the starting point for the district court’s decision and anchor the court’s discretion in selecting an appropriate sentence” (slip op. at 9, 15), the Supreme Court holds that the application of an erroneous Guidelines range will usually be sufficient to show a reasonable probability of a different outcome for the purposes of plain-error review under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(b).

State v. Donald Weso, 2015AP1004-Cr, 4/19/16, District 3 (1-judge opinion; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

This unpublished opinion appears to decide an issue of first impression for Wisconsin. Section 973.055(1) requires a court to impose a $100 surcharge if it finds that an adult convicted of domestic abuse committed the act “against an adult with whom [he] resides. ” The novel question is: what does “resides” mean? The answer is only a little more involved than the title to this post suggests.

State v. T.D.M., 2015AP2289, 4/20/16, District 2, (1-judge opinion; ineligible for publication); case activity

T.D.M. was charged with burglary and theft, as party to a crime, and obstructing an officer. The circuit court waived him into to adult court mostly because his “pattern of living” was more like an adult’s than a juvenile’s. That is, he was not reliant upon his mother for large periods of time. His whereabouts were unknown for at least 3 months in 2014. He allegedly had fathered a child. He did not attend school or avail himself of services. And he repeatedly violated curfew and came and went as he pleased. See ¶14.

State v. J.L.M., 2015AP1695, 4/19/16, District 1 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity

The State charged J.L.M. with one count of robbery with use of force, as a party to a crime, due to his alleged involvement with a group of youths who stole M.H.’s bike and struck him several times in the process. J.L.M. lost at trial and challenged the sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction. 

Waukesha County DH&HS v. K.R.G., 2016AP222, 4/20/16, District 2 (1-judge opinion; ineligible for publication); case activity

The court of appeals here holds that a mom’s failure to follow court orders and failure to make court appearances were egregious enough to justify a default finding of grounds for terminating her parental rights even though she asserted a “desire” and “determination” to participate in the proceeding.

Welch v. United States, USSC No. 15-6418, 2016 WL 1551144 (April 18, 2016), vacating and remanding an unpublished order of the 11th Circuit; Scotusblog page (including links to briefs and commentary)

Associate Federal Defender Shelley Fite has kindly agreed to provide her take on the high court’s latest:

Federal defenders and procedure wonks naturally appreciate Welch v. United States, in which the (7–1) Supreme Court held that Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015), applies retroactively to cases on collateral review.  But (read on!) the case does have some application for state practitioners—at least those who do post-conviction work.

Lawyers tracking how Wisconsin’s appellate courts are interpreting Wis. Stat. § 907.02(1), governing the admissibility of expert testimony, might be interested in this development. Seifert v. Balnik, the first Daubert case to reach SCOW was on track to be decided this term. It was twice listed for, and twice removed from, the oral argument schedule. According to the clerk’s office, SCOW has finished oral arguments for this term. The argument in Seifert has been pushed off to next term.

State v. M.K., 2015AP2098, District 1, 4/19/16 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

While the second (and final) extension of M.K.’s original CHIPS dispositional order listed only one of the three conditions M.K. had to meet for return of her son, the original order and first extension listed all three, and that’s good enough in the eyes of the court of appeals to satisfy the requirements of § 48.356(2).

State v. Gary F. Lemberger, 2015AP1452-CR, 4/14/2016, District 4 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication), petition for review granted 10/11/2016, affirmed, 2017 WI 39; case activity (including briefs)

A breathalyzer test is a Fourth Amendment search, and state case law holds that the state may not invite a jury to view a defendant’s refusal to consent to a search as evidence of guilt. So, can a prosecutor argue that a defendant’s refusal to take a breathalyzer shows his guilt? Don’t look to this case for an answer.