On Point

seventh circuit court of appeals decision

Habeas Review – Batson Claim 

The State’s pattern of peremptory strikes – at least 15, possibly 17, out of 20, directed at African-Americans – was so “disproportionate” as to “give[] rise to an inference of discrimination.” This is so, despite Harris limiting his challenges to 9 of these 17 strikes: “that does not make the pattern of strikes any less probative.” The strongly deferential nature of habeas review notwithstanding,

Green County v. Janeen J. C., 2011AP2603, District 4, 5/31/12

court of appeals decision (1-judge, not publishable); for Janeen J.C.: Katie R. York, SPD, Madison Appellate; case activity

The trial court, before entering an involuntary medication order, failed to make requisite findings that Janeen J.C. wasn’t competent to make an informed choice, Virgil D. v. Rock County, 189 Wis. 2d 1,

State v. Susan M. Thorstad, 2011AP2854-CR, District 4, 5/31/12

court of appeals decision (1-judge, not publishable); for Thorstad: Charles W. Giesen; case activity

Mistrial was granted after the arresting officer, in contravention of pretrial order, testified that this was Thorstad’s second OWI. However, the officer was unaware of the order, because the prosecutor had failed to advise of same, an omission the trial court attributed to “laxness on the part of the State.” The trial court then ruled that,

court of appeals publication orders, 5/31/12

On Point posts from this list:

2012 WI App 55 State v. Shawn M. Klingelhoets

2012 WI App 58 State v. Thomas M. Pocian

State v. Eric Archie Armstrong, District 2/1, 2010AP1056-CR, 5/30/12

court of appeals decision (not recommended for publication); for Armstrong: Ellen Henak, SPD, Milwaukee Appellate; case activity

Setting restitution four years after sentencing didn’t violate double jeopardy principles, turning principally on whether Johnson “had a legitimate expectation of finality in the first judgment,” State v. Greene, 2008 WI App 100, ¶15, 313 Wis.

court of appeals decision (1-judge, not for publication); for Anderson: Dennis M. Melowski, Chad A Lanning; case activity

Traffic Stop 

Probable cause found to support stop for unsafe lane deviation, § 346.13(1).

¶12      Here, DeNovi testified that, while traveling in a group of three vehicles, he observed Anderson’s vehicle drift into the outside lane for approximately 100 yards and then swerve back to the inside lane.  

court of appeals decision (1-judge, not for publication); for Thomas: John M. Carroll; case activity

Traffic Stop – Duration 

¶8        Thomas argues Schellinger lacked reasonable suspicion to extend the traffic stop because the only fact supporting Schellinger’s belief that Thomas was operating while intoxicated was the odor of intoxicants.  Thomas asserts the odor of intoxicants does not, by itself, constitute reasonable suspicion that a driver is operating while intoxicated.  

State v. Jason T. Moynihan, 2011AP2858-CR, District 2, 5/30/12

court of appeals decision (1-judge, not for publication); for Moynihan: Lora B. Cerone, SPD, Madison Appellate; case activity

¶8        In this case, the deputy pulled over the vehicle driven by Moynihan because he believed it was being driven by Saeger and believed that Saeger’s driver’s license was revoked.  The question is whether the deputy’s belief, or suspicion, was reasonable.  

State v. Douglas Meier Williams, 2012 WI 59, on review of court of appeals certification request; for Williams:  Stephen P. Hurley, Dean A. Strang, Marcus J. Berghahn, Jonas B. Bednarek; case activity

Wis. Stat. § 757.69(1)(b), giving circuit court commissioners authority to issue search warrants, is constitutional.

¶3   Throughout Wisconsin’s history, including before the ratification of the Wisconsin Constitution, non-judges have been authorized by statute to issue search warrants.  

Coleman v. Lorenzo Johnson, USSC No. 11-1053, 5/29/12 (per curiam), reversing 446 Fed. Appx. 531 (3rd Cir. 2011)

We have made clear that Jackson claims face a high bar in federal habeas proceedings because they are subject to two layers of judicial deference. First, on direct appeal, “it is the responsibility of the jury—not the court—to decide what conclusions should be drawn from evidence admitted at trial.