On Point

State v. Travis Vondell Cross, 2010 WI 70, on bypass; for Cross: William E. Schmaal, SPD, Madison Appellate; BiC; Resp.; Reply; Cross Supp.; AG Supp.

¶4 We hold that where a defendant is told that he faces a maximum possible sentence that is higher, but not substantially higher, than that authorized by law,

State v. Dwight Glen Jones, 2010 WI 72, affirming unpublished opinion; for Jones: Ellen Henak, SPD, Milwaukee Appellate; BiC; Resp.; Reply

¶43  The issues presented are first, whether Jones is entitled to a new trial on the grounds that the circuit court wrongly denied his request for substitution of counsel, and second, whether he is entitled to a new trial on the grounds that such a denial violates rights guaranteed by the Wisconsin Constitution and the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

State v. Hou Erik Vang, 2010 WI App 118; for Vang: John L. Sesini; BiC; Resp.; Reply

¶1        Hou Vang appeals an order denying his motion to withdraw his no contest pleas to second-degree sexual assault of a child and felony bail jumping. Vang argues WIS. STAT. §§ 971.08(1)(c), (2)[1] entitle him to withdraw his pleas because, although the circuit court provided the statutory deportation warning at his arraignment,

State v. Wendy A. Brown, 2010 WI App 113; for Brown: William E. Schmaal, SPD, Madison Appellate; BiC; Resp.; Reply

The significant risk of “serious property damage” underlying an NGI institutionalization-commitment, § 971.17(3)(a), doesn’t require physical damage to property; loss of money or goods — from identity theft in this instance — suffices:

¶13      The above definitions of property and damage are much broader than that which would be required to support Brown’s limited interpretation of property damage.  

State v. Rashaad A. Imani, 2010 WI 66, reversing 2009 WI App 98;habeas relief granted 6/22/16; for Imani: Basil M. Loeb; BiC; Resp.; Reply

¶3   We conclude that the circuit court properly denied Imani’s motion to represent himself. First, we determine that Imani did not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waive the right to counsel. The circuit court engaged Imani in two of the four lines of inquiry prescribed in Klessig and properly determined that Imani (1) did not make a deliberate choice to proceed without counsel,

publication orders, 6/30/10

2008AP002929
2010 WI App 72 Wendy M. Day v. Allstate Indemnity Company

2009AP000463
2010 WI App 73 Karen Poston v. Andrea L. Burns

2009AP000757
2010 WI App 74 Peter H. and Barbara J. Steuck Living Trust v. Newell L. Easley

2009AP000760
2010 WI App 75 Cottonwood Financial, LTD v. Darcie Estes

2009AP000775
2010 WI App 76 E-Z Roll Off,

State v. Roy B. Ismert, No. 2009AP1971-CR, District IV, 7/1/10

court of appeals decision (1-judge; not for publication); for Ismert: Kristen D. Schipper; BiC; Resp.; Reply

The evidence was sufficient to support the obstructing element that Ismert knew the police officer had legal authority to stop, question and arrest him.

¶14 We conclude that Lossman and Grobstick are persuasive on the facts before us.

2010 WI 61 (Abrahamson, CJ, Bradley, Crooks, JJ); 2010 62 (Prosser, Roggensack, Ziegler, JJ); Judicial Conduct Panel Findings, etc.; WJC Brief; Resp.; WJC Reply

Judicial Discipline – Campaign-Related Misconduct

The court splits 3-3 on whether Justice Gableman’s infamous “loophole” ad violated the Judicial Code. The Chief, et al. (61 bloc), say it did:

We three,

State v. Joshua D. Conger, 2010 WI 56, on certification; for Conger: Anthony L. O’Malley; Brief (State); Brief (Conger); Brief (Judge Grimm); Reply (Conger); Amicus (Prosecution Project, UW)

Plea Bargain – Rejection

A circuit court has post-arraignment authority to reject a proposed plea bargain that would result in amendment to the charge; State v.

Docket

Decision below (CTA8)

Questions Presented:

There is a conflict among the United States Courts of Appeals regarding a defendant’s post-sentencing rehabilitation and whether it can support a downward sentencing variance under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).

Whether a federal district judge can consider a defendant’s post-sentencing rehabilitation as a permissible factor supporting a sentencing variance under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) after Gall v.