On Point

Sears v. Upton, USSC No. 09-8854, 6/29/10

United States Supreme Court decision

The state court concluded that in this death penalty case, counsel failed to conduct more than a cursory penalty-phase investigation (and thus failed to determine that Sears suffered significant frontal lobe damage and had endured significant childhood abuse). However, the state court also concluded that it couldn’t find prejudice because counsel adduced some mitigation —

State v. Timothy Charles Bauer, 2010 WI App 93; for Bauer: Catherine M. Canright; BiC; Resp.; Reply

Search-Incident – Automobile

By failing to address Bauer’s Arizona v. Gant argument, instead relying solely on State v. Fry, 131 Wis. 2d 153, 174, 388 N.W.2d 565 (1986), the States’ argument compels the court to reverse the suppression order:

¶9 Here,

State v. Justin H., No. 2009AP2935, District III, 6/29/10

court of appeals decision (1-judge; not for publication); for Justin H.: Leonard D. Kachinsky

¶9 However, even assuming Justin properly preserved a due process argument, we reject it.  Due process principles require that a juvenile against whom a delinquency petition has been filed be given “notice … sufficiently in advance of scheduled court proceedings … set[ting] forth the alleged misconduct with particularity.” State v.

Sheboygan Co. DHHS v. Tanya M.B. / William S.L., 2010 WI 55, reversing unpublished court of appeals decision; for Tanya M.B.: Paul G. Bonneson; for William L.: Thomas K. Voss

CHIPS order entered under § 48.355(2)(b)1 “shall contain … specific services to be provided”; subsequent TPR based on lack of compliance with CHIPS conditions requires that the responsible agency made a reasonable effort to provide the ordered services.

McDonald v. City of Chicago, USSC No. 08-1521, 6/28/10

Two years ago, in District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U. S. ___ (2008), we held that the Second Amendment protects the right to keep and bear arms for the purpose of self-defense, and we struck down a District of Columbia law that banned the possession of handguns in the home. The city of Chicago (City) and the village of Oak Park,

court of appeals decision; pro se; Resp. Br.

Sentence Modification – DNA Surcharge

¶2        Singleton was sentenced on July 24, 2002, and the circuit court ordered, as a condition of his bifurcated sentence, that Singleton provide a DNA sample and pay the applicable surcharge.[1] Singleton’s sole challenge is made via a motion to modify his sentence under Wis. Stat. § 973.19 (2007-08), and is addressed only to the adequacy of the court’s explanation for imposition of the surcharge under Cherry,

Rock Co. DHS v. Calvin M. M., No. 2010AP816, District IV, 6/24/10

court of appeals decision (1-judge; not for publication); for Calvin M.M.: Brian C. Findley

Admission of hearsay, describing an act of domestic violence was harmless:

¶7        There are two reasons why we conclude admitting this apparent hearsay evidence was harmless error. We first observe that one of the elements the County had to prove at trial was that Calvin had not met all of the conditions for return.

Issue: Whether, in federal habeas corpus proceedings, a state law under which a prisoner may be barred from collaterally attacking his conviction when the prisoner “substantially delayed” filing his habeas petition is “inadequate” to support a procedural bar because (1) the federal court believes that the rule is vague and (2) the state failed to prove that its courts “consistently” exercised their discretion when applying the rule in other cases.

Docket: 09-996

• Opinion below (9th Circuit,

State v. Patrick M. Zurkowski, No. 2009AP929-CR, District III, 6/22/10

court of appeals decision (3-judge, not recommended for publication); for Zurkowski: Michael J. Fairchild; BiC; Resp.

1st-Degree Intentional Homicide – Sufficient Evidence, Intent

¶13      That Zurkowski killed June through a combination of repeated blows and cutting her tongue with a ceramic object he crammed in her mouth, rather than by killing her via a single fatal wound,

State v. Charles D. Brown, No. 2009AP2093-CR, District I, 6/23/10

court of appeals decision (3-judge, not recommended for publication); for Brown: Martin J. Pruhs; BiC; Resp.

Under State v. Comstock, 168 Wis. 2d 915, 485 N.W.2d 354 (1992), a court may not sua sponte order withdrawal of a guilty plea, absent fraud or intentional withholding of material information.