On Point: C. Unpublished Opinions

State v. Jeffrey R. Lindahl, 2019AP997-CR, District 3, 12/15/20 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

In State v. Hahn, 2000 WI 118, 238 Wis. 2d 889, 618 N.W.2d 528, the supreme court held that a collateral attack against a prior conviction used to enhance a penalty must be based on the denial of the right to counsel in the prior case. The court of appeals holds that “denial of the right to counsel” doesn’t include denial of the right to the effective assistance of counsel.

Barron County DHS v. M.S., 2020AP1257, District 3, 12/17/20, (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity

If we were quarantining in Vegas, we’d bet this case is heading to SCOW.  The briefs are confidential but the main issues appear to be: whether the summary judgment deadline in §802.08(1) governs TPR cases; whether a court may extend that deadline for good cause; and how those rules apply to the facts of this case. The COA sows confusion by stating that it has conducted “independent research” suggesting that, despite SCOW precedent and the parties’ agreement, §802.08(1) doesn’t actually apply. It then applies §802.08(1).

Outagamie County v. R.W., 2020AP1171-FT, 12/17/20, District 3, (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity

Nobody testified that Rachel behaved dangerously during her extant commitment. Her doctor had no knowledge of medication non-compliance.  A social worker once saw a Haldol pill on a plate on a counter and inferred that Rachel had not taken her meds on that occasion.  The reason that doctor and social worker recommended recommitment is that several times in the past Rachel was released from commitment, stopped medication, and decompensated. To prevent that cycle, she had to be recommited. Rachel cannot change the past, so by that logic, she must be recommitted forever.

Fond Du Lac County v. R.O.V., 2019AP1228, 2020AP853, 12/16/20, District 2 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity

In these consolidated cases, the court of appeals reviewed both Ray’s initial commitment and his 2nd recommitment (not his 1st recommitment), which has not yet ended. Although the initial commitment order expired long ago, the court held that it was not moot due to a recurring, “sufficiency of the evidence” regarding dangerousness that might affect the outcome of his appeal from the 2nd recommitment.

The doctors who examined Ray for his initial commitment and for his 2nd recommitment agreed that he is mentally ill and a proper subject for treatment. They diagnosed him with either bipolar disorder with psychotic features, schizoaffective disorder bipolar type, or schizophrenia.  The main dispute was over his alleged dangerousness.

State v. Gerald D. Taylor, 2019AP1244-CR, District 1, 12/15/20, (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

In 1999, a court imposed two, consecutive, 30-year indeterminate sentences on Taylor for child sexual assault. Accounting for the parole system in place, the court told Taylor he would be eligible for parole after serving one-quarter (15 years) of his sentence, and he could end up serving two-thirds (40 years), which is when he would reach his mandatory release date. Taylor moved for a sentence modification because the court didn’t realize his sentence had a presumptive release date (not a mandatory release) which results in a lengthier confinement.

Washington County v. James Michael Conigliaro, 2020AP888, District 2, 12/9/20 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Conigliaro appealed an order finding that he refused to submit to an evidentiary chemical test. He argued that the arresting officer, Joseph Lagash, led him to believe that he had the right to consult with an attorney before deciding whether to submit to the test and/or that Lagash failed to dispel his belief that he had the right to counsel. The court of appeals rejects both arguments.

City of Oshkosh v. Brian D. Hamill, 2020AP867, District 2, 12/2/20 (1-judge opinion; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

The facts are just that simple. At 2:38 a.m. (bar closing time) an officer observed Hamill’s Jeep drifting to the right line of its lane, then to the center for 30-40 feet, then to the left centerline, and then to the right line of its lane. It was undisputed that Hamlin’s Jeep never crossed over either lane marker. And yet the circuit held that these facts gave the officer reasonable suspicion to conduct an investigator traffic stop.

State v. D.A.M., 2020AP821, District 2, 11/25/20 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

The evidence at D.A.M.’s trial was sufficient to show his conduct constituted a terrorist threat under § 947.019.

City of New Berlin v. Eric John Dreher, 2020AP850, District 2, 11/25/20 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

An officer testified he observed Dreher cut across lanes while turning, deviate from his lane, and travel at a high rate of speed. This led the officer to believe the driver was impaired, as “it was some of the worst driving that [he] observed in over 250 drink driv[ing] arrests.”

State v. Michael Anthony Dotson, 2019AP1082-CR, District 3, 11/24/20 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Though this is a “close case” (¶28), the objectively reasonable inferences from the totality of the facts and circumstances known to the officer who stopped Dotson’s car did not provide reasonable suspicion to believe that Dotson’s blood alcohol level exceeded the legal limits or that his ability to operate his vehicle was impaired. Thus, the officer’s detention of Dotson to conduct field sobriety tests was unlawful.