On Point blog, page 90 of 265
TPR court had insufficient information to conclude it had jurisdiction
J.P. v. A.P., 2018AP1775 through 2018AP1778, District 4, 4/18/19 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity
In this unusual case, the court of appeals agrees with a parent in a TPR proceeding that the circuit court may not have subject matter jurisdiction under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act because of an order issued in another state governs custody of the children.
Alleged omissions from search warrant application didn’t invalidate warrant
State v. Calvin Lee Brown, 2018AP766-CR, District 1, 4/9/19 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)
Brown challenged a search warrant that was executed at his home, arguing the police omitted information about J.R.R., an informant who was cited in the warrant application, and that the information provided reason to doubt J.R.R.’s credibility. The court of appeals rejects the challenge.
Summary judgment at TPR grounds phase reversed due to inadequate notice during CHIPS proceedings
Jackson County DHS v. R.H.H., Jr., 2018AP2440 to 208AP2443, District 4, 4/4/19 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity
At the grounds phase R.H.H.’s termination of parental rights proceedings, the circuit court granted the County’s motion for summary judgment on the basis of continuing denial of visitation under § 48.415(4). Not so fast, says the court of appeals.
Officer had probable cause to arrest defendant for OWI after a 1-minute interaction with him
State v. Timothy Edward Curtis, 2018AP920-CR, 4/2/19, District 3, (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
The State charged Curtis with a 2nd offense OWI. He moved to suppress evidence obtained after his arrest on the grounds that the officer didn’t have probable cause for the arrest in the first place. He lost in the circuit court and in the court of appeals.
CoA rejects plea, ineffective assistance and new trial claims; affirms TPR order
State v. T.R.C., 2018AP820, 4/2/19, District 1 (1-judge opinion, eligible for publication); case activity
T.R.C. pled “no contest” to grounds for termination of her parental rights to D. On appeal she argued that her plea was not knowing, intelligent and voluntary, that her trial counsel was ineffective, and that the TPR order should be vacated in the interests of justice. The court of appeals affirmed.
Unauthorized stay of sentence should be remedied by resentencing, not vacating of stay
State v. Caleb J. Hawley, 2018AP1601-CR, District 4, 3/28/19 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
The judge who sentenced Hawley after revocation of probation stayed the sentence and ordered it to start some 14 months down the road, when Hawley would finished serving the 18 months of conditional jail time ordered in a different case. That stay was illegal, and the remedy is resentencing—not, as Hawley argues, credit for the time he was in custody since the day of his sentencing after revocation.
Traffic stop, field sobriety tests lawful
State v. Faith A. Parafiniuk, 2018AP1956, District 2, 3/27/19 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
The stop of Parafiniuk’s car was supported by reasonable suspicion and the officer had sufficient reason to extend the stop to administer field sobriety tests.
Escalona hurdle overcome, but § 974.06 motion rejected on merits
State v. Casey M. Fisher, 2017AP868, District 1, 3/26/19 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)
Fisher’s § 974.06 postconviction motion clears the hurdle erected by State v. Escalona-Naranjo, 185 Wis. 2d 168, 517 N.W.2d 157 (1994), but fails on the merits.
Ineffective assistance, multiplicity claims rejected
State v. Martez C. Fennell, 2017AP2480-CR, District 1, 3/26/19 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)
Fennell unsuccessfully challenges his convictions for armed robbery and operating a vehicle without the owner’s consent, arguing that the charges are multiplicitous and that trial counsel should have subpoenaed a witness who would have impeached the victim’s identification of him.
Court of appeals holds defendant can be forced to choose: wear a stun belt or don’t attend your trial
State v. Danny L. Benford, 2017AP2520-CR, 3/26/19, District 3 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)
The Eau Claire County Sheriff Department’s policy is to require all defendants appearing for trial to wear a stun belt under their clothing. Benford did not want to wear one because he didn’t trust the sheriff’s not to zap him for no good reason. The trial court conducted an inquiry into the need for the stun belt, concluded it was necessary, and found no other suitable alternative to it.