On Point: 9. Crimes

Birchfield v. North Dakota, USSC No. 14-1468, 2016 WL 3434398 (June 23, 2016), reversing State v. Birchfield, 858 N.W.2d 302 (N.D. 2015); vacating and remanding State v. Beylund, 861 N.W.2d 172 (N.D. 2015); and affirming State v. Bernard, 844 N.W.2d 41 (Minn. 2014); Scotusblog pages: Birchfield, Beylund, Bernard (include links to briefs and commentary)

Three years ago, in Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552 (2013), the Court rejected a bright-line rule that police may always conduct a warrantless alcohol test on a motorist they have probable cause to believe is driving drunk, pursuant to the exigent circumstances exception. In these three cases, the Court adopts a bright-line rule that the police may always conduct a warrantless alcohol test on a motorist they have arrested for driving drunk, pursuant to the search incident to arrest exception. But they can only Conduct a test of the motorist’s breath, and not the motorist’s blood. Make sense?

State v. Brian R. Corvino, 2016 WI App 52; case activity (including briefs)

This decision examines § 967.055(2)(a), which requires the State to apply to the circuit court before amending an OWI charge. The court of appeals found that amending the charge here would be inconsistent with the public policy of deterring drunk-driving and held that the circuit court had the inherent authority to order the State to file an Information charging Corvino’s 4th OWI as a felony.

State v. Keith A. Wiedmeyer, 2016 WI App 46; case activity (including briefs)

In an impressive of feat of judicial activism, the court of appeals here rewrites §343.305(5)(d) and (6)(a) and defies precedent to achieve its desired outcome: the admission of statutorily invalid blood test results at OWI trials. On Point looks forward to SCOW’s take on this published court of appeals decision.

Walworth County v. James E. Robinson, Jr., 2015AP2504-FT, 5/18/16, District 2 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including memo briefs)

The County needed to prove Robinson drove his motor vehicle on a highway while under the influence of a drug to a degree which rendered him incapable of safely driving, § 346.63(1)(a). It succeeded.

State v. Jeffrey S. Decker, 2015AP1997-CR, District 2, 5/4/2016 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

Jeffrey Decker had been banned from the UW-Oshkosh, and was arrested when he arrived at a grand opening event. The arrest was not without incident and he was charged with obstructing an officer and convicted after a jury trial.

State v. Melvin P. Vongvay, 2015AP1827-CR, District 2, 5/4/2016 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Wisconsin Stat. § 885.235(1g) makes a blood alcohol test automatically admissible in a drunk driving prosecution if the blood is drawn within three hours of the alleged driving. The court here holds that an officer who was running up against the end of that three-hour window was justified in drawing blood without seeking a warrant.

State v. Phillip Kareen Green, 2015AP1126-CR, 4/26/16, District 1 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Green argues that the evidence was insufficient to convict him of first degree reckless homicide because it didn’t prove he acted with utter disregard for human life. He also argues for a new trial in the interest of justice on the grounds that: 1) the jury wasn’t fully instructed about the interaction between self-defense and the utter disregard element; and 2) important facts were not introduced or placed in proper context. The court of appeals rejects Green’s claims in a decision heavy on facts and light on analysis.

State v. J.L.M., 2015AP1695, 4/19/16, District 1 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity

The State charged J.L.M. with one count of robbery with use of force, as a party to a crime, due to his alleged involvement with a group of youths who stole M.H.’s bike and struck him several times in the process. J.L.M. lost at trial and challenged the sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction. 

State v. Michael A. Durham, 2015AP1978-CR, 4/12/2016, District 3 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Police were dispatched in response to a 6:30 p.m. phone call from a neighbor about unintelligible yelling and “banging” that shook the walls of Durham’s residence. (¶2). After knocking and ringing the doorbell and receiving no response, police simply entered the house, guns drawn, and proceeded toward the stairs, where they encountered Durham. (¶¶3-5). The officers ordered Durham to show his hands, he didn’t, and they tasered him. (¶6). He was charged with resisting an officer, unsuccessfully moved to suppress evidence obtained via the warrantless search of his home, and was convicted at trial. (¶1). The court of appeals here reverses the conviction because the suppression motion should have been granted.

On review of a court of appeals certification; case activity (including briefs)

Issue (from certification)

This appeal presents a single recurring issue: whether provisions in Wisconsin’s implied consent law authorizing a warrantless blood draw from an unconscious suspect violate the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. More specifically, the issue is whether the “implied consent,” deemed to have occurred before a defendant is a suspect, is voluntary consent for purposes of the consent exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement.