On Point: A. Expectation of privacy

State v. Johnny K. Pinder, 2018 WI 106, 11/16/18, on certification from the court of appeals; 2017AP208; case activity (including briefs)

The police thought Pinder was probably the culprit in a string of burglaries, so they applied for, and got, a warrant to attach a GPS device to his car. They did not actually do the attaching, though, until 10 days after they got the warrant. This seems to run afoul of Wis. Stat. § 968.15, which together with surrounding provisions defines, authorizes and regulates the issuance of search warrants. Specifically, it says a warrant not executed within five days of issuance is “void.”

State v. Ronald Lee Baric, 2018 WI App 63; case activity (including briefs)

Police failed to read Baric his Miranda rights, but the court of appeals still found that he consented to a search of his computer. It also resolved a 4th Amendment issue of first impression for Wisconsin: a person has no reasonable expectation of privacy in files he offers for download on a P2P file sharing network.

State v. Gerald P. Mitchell, 2018 WI 84, 7/3/18, on certification from the court of appeals; 2015AP304-CR, SCOTUS cert. granted, 1/11/19, vacated and remanded, 6/29/19; case activity (including briefs)

This is the supreme court’s third attempt to decide whether provisions of Wisconsin’s implied consent law comport with the Fourth Amendment. If you’ve been following along, you might have predicted the result: no majority opinion, no binding holding, and, as the lead opinion laments, a state of confusion going forward. Briefly: the lead, 3-justice opinion says “we overrule State v. Padley,” a court of appeals decision addressing a related (though not identical) issue, but it in fact does no such thing: it seems, in fact, to echo much of the discussion in Padley, and anyway, it’s a three-justice minority, and can’t overrule anything. A two-justice concurrence says the legislature can’t legislate away a motorist’s right to refuse consent to a search, but would hold that a blood draw of an unconscious OWI suspect doesn’t require a warrant anyway, despite a pretty clear statement to the contrary from SCOTUS. And a two-justice dissent also says the implied consent law doesn’t equal constitutional consent. So, just as in State v. Hager from this term, you have a result that favors the state, even though a majority of justices disagree with the state’s constitutional argument.

Collins v. Virginia, USSC No. 16-1027, 2018 WL 2402551, 5/29/18, reversing Collins v. Commonwealth, 790 S.E.2d 611 (Va. 2016); SCOTUSblog page (includes links to briefs and commentary)

Police learned a stolen motorcycle that had evaded them on two occasions was likely parked at a house where Collins stayed. When they got to the house, they saw a motorcycle parked in the driveway with a tarp over it. They walked up the driveway, lifted the tarp, and confirmed that it was the stolen bike. The Supreme Court now holds that, though the motorcycle was an automobile–and hence subject to the “automobile exception,” which dispenses with the warrant requirement where there’s probable cause to search a vehicle–this fact does not justify the officers’ invasion of the home’s curtilage to search it.

Byrd v. United States, USSC No. 16-1371, 2018 WL 2186175 (May 14, 2018), vacating United States v. Byrd, 679 Fed. Appx. 146 (3rd Cir. 2017); SCOTUSblog page (includes links to briefs and commentary)

Terrence Byrd was pulled over while driving a rental car with no passengers. Officers quickly realized the rental agreement for the car did not name him as the renter or an authorized driver. Though Byrd told the officers his friend had rented it, they decided he had “no expectation of privacy” and searched the car, finding body armor and heroin.

Both the district court and Third Circuit agreed with the officers: a driver not on the rental contract has no standing to complain about the search of a rental car. But all nine members of the Court conclude to the contrary: at least where a driver’s possession of the vehicle is not akin to having stolen the car (a murky caveat the Court does not today clarify), mere breach of the rental contract does not negate a reasonable expectation of privacy.

Kerr’s latest post considers 2 recent federal district court decisions on this subject. One raises the question of whether, under the 5th Amendment, the government may compel a suspect to enter a passcode to unlock his device.  The other considers whether the government may use a passcode obtained from a suspect in violation of Miranda to unlock his phone. Read the full post here.

State v. Johnny K. Pinder, 2017AP208-CR, District 2, certification filed 12/13/17, certification granted 3/14/18, affirmed, 2018 WI 106; case activity (including briefs)

Issue (from certification):

If a search warrant issued under WIS. STAT. § 968.12 for the placement and use of a GPS tracking device on a motor vehicle is not executed within five days after the date of issuance per WIS. STAT. § 968.15(1) is the warrant void under § 968.15(2), even if the search was otherwise reasonably conducted?

State v. Bryan J. Landwehr, 2016AP2536-CR, 11/7/17, District 3 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication) case activity (including briefs)

The court of appeals holds that officers lacked a valid community caretaker basis to seize Landwehr from his garage based on speculation that he might engage in a domestic dispute in the future.

United States v. Microsoft Corp., USSC No. 17-2, certiorari granted 10/16/17

Question presented:

Whether a United States provider of email services must comply with a probable-cause-based warrant issued under 18 U.S.C. § 2703 by making disclosure in the United States of electronic communications within that provider’s control, even if the provider has decided to store that material abroad.

Collins v. Virginia, USSC No. 16-1027, cert granted 9/28/17; lower court opinion; USSC docket; SCOTUSblog page

Question presented: Whether the Fourth Amendment’s automobile exception permits a police officer, uninvited and without a warrant, to enter private property, approach a house and search a vehicle parked a few feet from the house.