On Point: B. Opinions

Fortunately, Wisconsin does not have the death penalty. However, On Point readers might find this SCOTUS decision Madison v. Alabama, interesting. The government cannot execute a prisoner who is insane or is so mentally ill that he can’t understand the State’s rationale for executing him. Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986) and Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930 (2007).

Carpenter v. United States, USSC No. 16-402, 2018 WL 3073916, reversing United States v. Carpenter, 819 F.3d 880 (6th Cir. 2016); Scotusblog page (includes links to briefs and commentary)

This one is a big deal. It’s impossible to say just where the law will go from here, but it’s clear there will be a lot of cases citing this one in the coming years, both because cell-site location is already a widely-used law enforcement tool, and because the majority opinion has a lot to say about what Fourth Amendment “privacy” might mean now that we all share, often unwittingly, so much information about ourselves with the entities that enable our digital lives.

Currier v. Virginia, USSC No. 16-1348, 2018 WL 3073763, June 22, 2018, affirming State v. Currier, 779 S.E.2d 834 (Va. App. 2015), reasoning adopted by 798 S.E.2d 164 (Va. 2016); Scotusblog page (includes links to briefs and commentary)

A defendant who agrees to have overlapping charges considered in two separate trials cannot invoke the doctrine of issue preclusion adopted in Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436 (1970), and argue that an acquittal in the first trial bars a second trial on the remaining charges.

Rosales-Mireles v. United States, USSC No. 16-9493, 2018 WL 3013806, 6/18/18, reversing United States v. Rosales-Mireles, 850 F.3d 246 (5th Cir. 2017); SCOTUSblog page (includes links to briefs and commentary)

As we noted in our prior post, this case is primarily of interest to federal practitioners, dealing as it does with the federal sentencing guidelines and the doctrine of plain error, which is little-used in Wisconsin’s courts. Nevertheless, the seven-justice majority has some ringing language exhorting courts, in the interest of their own legitimacy, to cop to their own errors when those errors lead to unwarranted consequences for criminal defendants.

Collins v. Virginia, USSC No. 16-1027, 2018 WL 2402551, 5/29/18, reversing Collins v. Commonwealth, 790 S.E.2d 611 (Va. 2016); SCOTUSblog page (includes links to briefs and commentary)

Police learned a stolen motorcycle that had evaded them on two occasions was likely parked at a house where Collins stayed. When they got to the house, they saw a motorcycle parked in the driveway with a tarp over it. They walked up the driveway, lifted the tarp, and confirmed that it was the stolen bike. The Supreme Court now holds that, though the motorcycle was an automobile–and hence subject to the “automobile exception,” which dispenses with the warrant requirement where there’s probable cause to search a vehicle–this fact does not justify the officers’ invasion of the home’s curtilage to search it.

McCoy v. Louisiana, USSC No. 16 – 8255, 2018 WL 218-617, 5/14/18, reversing and remanding State v. McCoy, 2018 So.3d 535 (La. 2016); SCOTUSblog page (includes links to briefs and commentary).

In a 6-3 opinion written by Justice Ginsburg, SCOTUS holds that the Sixth Amendment guarantees a defendant the right to choose the objective of his defense and to insist that his lawyer refrain from admitting that he is guilty of a charged crime when he objects to that admission. It further holds that if a lawyer concedes guilt in this situation, Strickland and the harmless error rule do not apply. The defendant automatically gets a new trial.

Dahda v. United States, USSC No. 17-43, 2018 WL 2186173 (May 14, 2018), affirming United States v. Dahda, 853 F.3d 1101 (10th Cir. 2017); Scotusblog page (including links to briefs and commentary)

This decision will be important to federal criminal defense practitioners dealing with evidence obtained with wiretap orders issued under 18 U.S.C. § 2510 et seq, as a unanimous Court clarifies the application of United States v. Giordano, 416 U.S. 505 (1974), to suppression challenges under 18 U.S.C. § 2518(10)(a)(ii).

On March 5, 2018, the Supreme Court decided U.S. Bank N.A. v. Village at Lakeridge, USSC No. 15-1509, 2018 WL 1143822, a bankruptcy case that we note here solely because it addresses a narrow issue that can matter to appellate litigators, civil and criminal: What is the standard of appellate review of mixed questions of law and fact? The answer: Well, it “depends,” though less so in the kind of constitutional questions criminal litigators often face.

Rodney Class v. United States, USSC No. 16-424, 2018 WL 987347 (February 21, 2018), reversing United States v. Class, (unreported) (D.C. Cir. 2016); Scotusblog page (inlcuding links to briefs and commentary)

“The question [in this case] is whether a guilty plea by itself bars a federal criminal defendant from challenging the constitutionality of the statute of conviction on direct appeal. We hold that it does not. Class did not relinquish his right to appeal the District Court’s constitutional determinations simply by pleading guilty.” (Slip op. at 3).

District of Columbia v. Wesby, USSC No. 15-1485, 2017 WL 491521 (January 22, 2018), reversing Wesby v. District of Columbia, 765 F.3d 13 (D.C. Cir. 2014); Scotusblog page (including links to briefs and commentary)

The probable-cause determination in this case is quite fact-specific, and the qualified immunity issue is of little interest to criminal practitioners. Perhaps more interesting is Justice Ginsburg’s concurrence, which signals she is open to reconsidering whether the existence of probable cause necessarily validates an arrest.