On Point: 44. SCOTUS

Elijah Manuel v. City of Joliet, Illinois, USSC No. 14-9496, 2017WL1050976 (March 21, 2017), reversing and remanding Manuel v. Illinois, 590 FedAppx. 641 (7th Cir. 2015)(unpublished); SCOTUSblog page (including links to briefs and commentary)

This decision is noteworthy for two reasons. First, it’s a reminder that when something goes very wrong in your client’s case he or she could have a civil rights claim under 42 U.S.C. §1983. Second, it  brought the 7th Circuit in line with 10 other circuits, which hold that the 4th Amendment right to be free from seizure unless there’s probable cause extends through the pretrial period.

Miguel Angel Peña-Rodriguez v. Colorado, USSC No. 15-606, 2017 WL 855760 (March 6, 2017), reversing Peña-Rodriguez v. People, 350 P.3d 287 (Colo. 2015); Scotusblog page

Every state and federal jurisdiction has some version of the “no-impeachment rule,” which, after a verdict is received, bars an aggrieved party from presenting testimony by jurors regarding the jury’s deliberations. SCOTUS has twice upheld such rules against constitutional challenge, while allowing that there could be certain cases in which refusing to permit such testimony would be too harmful to justice. The court now decides that the no-impeachment rule must give way to the Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury where “a juror makes a clear statement that indicates he or she relied on racial stereotypes or animus to convict a criminal defendant.”

Travis Beckless v. United States, USSC No. 15-8544, 2017 WL 855781 (March 6, 2017), affirming Beckles v. United States, 616 Fed. Appx. 415 (11th Cir. 2015) (unpublished); Scotusblog page (including links to briefs and commentary)

The Supreme Court holds that provisions in the federal advisory sentencing guidelines are not subject to vagueness challenges under the Due Process Clause.

Michael Damon Rippo v. Renee Baker, Warden, USSC No. 16-6316, 2017 WL 855913 (March 6, 2017) (per curiam), reversing and remanding Rippo v. State, 368 P.3d 729 (Nev. 2016); Scotusblog page

In this per curiam decision, the Supreme Court holds the lower court erred in demanding a defendant show actual bias to satisfy his claim that his due process right to an impartial judge was violated.

Buck v. Davis, USSC No. 15-8049, 2017 WL 685534 (February 22, 2017), reversing and remanding Buck v. Stephens, 623 Fed. Appx. 668 (5th Cir. 2015) (unpublished); Scotusblog page (including links to briefs and commentary)

Buck was found guilty of capital murder. Under state law, the jury could impose a death sentence only if it found Buck was likely to commit acts of violence in the future. At sentencing Buck’s attorney called Walter Quijano, a psychologist, to give an opinion on that issue. Though the psychologist testified Buck probably would not engage in violent conduct, he also said that race is one factor in assessing a person’s propensity for violence and that Buck was statistically more likely to act violently because he is black. The jury sentenced Buck to death. The Supreme Court, by a 7-to-2 vote, holds Buck’s attorney was ineffective.

Question presented:

Did the Supreme Court’s decision in Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86 (2011), silently abrogate the presumption set forth in Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797 (1991)—that a federal court sitting in habeas proceedings should “look through” a summary state court ruling to review the last reasoned decision—as a slim majority of the en banc Eleventh Circuit held in this case, despite the agreement of both parties that the Ylst presumption should continue to apply?

Question presented:

Whether, when this court held in Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985), that an indigent defendant is entitled to meaningful expert assistance for the “evaluation, preparation, and presentation of the defense,” it clearly established that the expert should be independent of the prosecution.

Question presented:

Whether a defendant asserting ineffective assistance that results in a structural error must, in addition to demonstrating deficient performance, show that he was prejudiced by counsel’s ineffectiveness, as held by four circuits and five state courts of last resort; or whether prejudice is presumed in such cases, as held by four other circuits and two state high courts.

Question presented:

Whether the rule established in Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309 (2012), and Trevino v. Thaler, 133 S. Ct. 1911 (2013), that ineffective state habeas counsel can be seen as cause to overcome the procedural default of a substantial ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim, also applies to procedurally defaulted, but substantial, ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claims.

Question presented:

Whether the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit erred by holding, in direct conflict with the Courts of Appeals for the First, Fourth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits, that a naturalized American citizen can be stripped of her citizenship in a criminal proceeding based on an immaterial false statement.