On Point blog, page 134 of 263
Forgoing lesser-included instruction a reasonable strategic choice
State v. Terry S. Shannon, 2015AP922, 12/7/2016, District 2 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)
Terry Shannon appeals the denial of his Wis. Stat. § 974.06 motion. He was convicted, at trial, of first-degree intentional homicide; he alleges his trial counsel was ineffective for not requesting that the jury be instructed on second-degree intentional.
Due process doesn’t forbid DNA surcharge where no sample taken
State v. Travis J. Manteuffel, 2016AP96-CR, 12/6/16, District 3 (1-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
State v. Elward, 2015 WI App 51, 363 Wis. 2d 628, 866 N.W.2d 756, held it an ex post facto violation to require misdemeanants to pay the $200 DNA surcharge where the law imposing it went into effect after they had committed their crimes.
Per curiam court of appeals decision addresses “greater latitude” language in § 904.04(2)(b)
State v. Anton R. Dorsey, 2015AP648-CR, District 3, 12/6/16 (per curiam; not citable as precedent or for persuasive value), petition for review granted, 4/10/17, affirmed, 2018 WI 10; case activity (including briefs)
You may not cite this per curiam opinion as binding precedent or for persuasive value in any Wisconsin court, see § 809.23(3)(b), but On Point is telling you about it because the court of appeals concludes that the purported “greater latitude” rule in § 904.04(2)(b)1. is not a codification of the “greater latitude” rule created by case law regarding admission of other acts evidence in child sex cases. While you can’t cite this decision for authority, you may and should use the court’s reasoning for its conclusion to counter the claim of a prosecutor or circuit judge that § 904.04(2)(b)1. codifies a “greater latitude” rule.
DA tells jury: “In order to acquit you must find victims were lying”
State v. Gerrod R. Bell, 2015AP2667-2668-CR, 12/1/16, District 4 (not recommended for publication), petition for review granted 3/13/2017, affirmed, 2018 WI 28; case activity (including briefs)
Bell was convicted of sexually assaulting two sisters aged 14 and 17. At trial, the DA told the jury that it couldn’t acquit unless it first concluded that the sisters were lying and unless Bell established a reason for them to lie. On appeal, Bell argued that the DA’s argument violated the principles that the State has to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, a defendant is presumed innocent, and a defendant has the right not to testify at trial. Bell also asserted ineffective assistance based on his lawyers failure to redact exhibits provided to the jury.
Challenges to seizure, arrest, refusal finding rejected
Washington County v. Daniel L. Schmidt, 2016AP908, District 2, 11/30/16 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
Schmidt makes a three-pronged attack on the revocation of his driving privileges for refusing a chemical test, arguing he was seized without reasonable suspicion, arrested without probable cause, and did not improperly refuse a test. The court of appeals rejects each claim.
Reluctant, forgetful witness’s statements to police properly admitted as prior inconsistent statements
State v. Connie Mae Apfel, 2016AP188-CR, District 3, 11/29/16 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
The circuit court properly exercised its discretion in admitting extrinsic evidence of the complaining witness’s statements to the police as prior inconsistent statements under §§ 908.01(4)(a)1. and 906.13(2)(a) after the witness expressed reluctance to testify and said he didn’t remember what he told police.
Statute governing transportation of firearms doesn’t preclude CCW conviction
State v. Brian Grandberry, 2016AP173-CR, District 1, 11/29/16 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication), petition for review granted 3/13/17; affirmed 4/10/18; case activity (including briefs)
Grandberry was charged with carrying a concealed weapon after police stopped the car he was driving and found a loaded pistol in the glove compartment. Citing § 167.31, which regulates the transportation of firearms, he argues he was not “carrying” a concealed weapon but was instead “transporting” it under § 167.31(2)(b)(intro.) and 1., which allow handguns to be transported in a car, even when loaded. (¶6). The court of appeals says this argument misses its mark.
Over-the-road trucker’s cab counts as “residence” for purposes of domestic abuse modifiers
State v. Michael Lee Brayson, 2016AP896-CR, District 1, 11/29/16 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
Brayson’s girlfriend, L.A.R., is a long-haul trucker. When she goes out on the road he accompanies her and stays with her in the truck, though both maintained separate addresses in Mississippi. (¶¶3-6). Under these facts, Brayson’s convictions for battery of L.A.R. at a Wisconsin travel center were subject to the domestic abuse surcharges and modifiers under §§ 968.075(1)(a)(intro.) and 973.055(1)(a)2. because Brayson and L.A.R. “reside[d]” together in the truck.
Evidence sufficient to support extension of protective placement order
Milwaukee County v. M.G.-H., 2016AP596, District 1, 11/29/16 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity
The evidence presented at a hearing on whether to continue M.G.-H.’s protective placement was sufficient to show M.G.-H. “has a primary need for residential care and custody” and “is so totally incapable of providing for his or her own care or custody as to create a substantial risk of serious harm to himself or herself or others,” as required by § 55.08(1)(a) and (c).
TPR decision affirmed
State v. T.R.D., 2016AP1413, District 1, 11/29/16 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity
T.R.D. challenges the circuit court’s conclusions that she was an unfit parent and that it was in the best interests of her child for T.R.D.’s parental rights to be terminated. The court of appeals rejects the challenges.